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87 
IS SYSTEMIC RISK PREVENTION THE NEW 
PARADIGM? A PROPOSAL TO EXPAND 
INVESTOR PROTECTION PRINCIPLES TO 
THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 
CARY MARTIN† 
INTRODUCTION 
The tragic events that the financial crisis yielded will haunt 
us for generations.  In 2008, bank failures, government bailouts, 
and widespread foreclosures infiltrated the daily lives of every 
single American.  The corresponding stock market losses and job 
lay-offs were astounding.  Many of us thought that our regulators 
and market participants had long before absorbed the hard-
earned lessons from the Great Depression.  However, it became 
painfully clear that history may have repeated itself had the 
government not aggressively intervened by putting a remarkably 
expensive Band-Aid on the economy.  As to be expected, the 
government has been under severe political pressure to ensure 
that comparable events never happen again.  In response to this 
pressure, Congress recently passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) 
which subjects numerous financial institutions to sweeping 
regulation.1   
 
† J.D., Northwestern University School of Law (May 2006); William H. Hastie 
Fellow and LLM Candidate, University of Wisconsin Law School (expected 
completion, May 2012). I would like to extend special thanks to Professor Peter 
Carstensen and Professor Darian Ibrahim from the University of Wisconsin Law 
School for their invaluable comments. I would also like to thank Professor Lisa 
Fairfax from George Washington University Law School, and Professor Dorothy 
Brown from Emory University School of Law School for their tremendously helpful 
feedback. Additionally, I would like to thank my co-fellow, Lahny Silva, for her 
comments and endearing support throughout this process. Of course, all errors are 
my own. 
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S. Code). 
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The Dodd-Frank Act is largely focused on monitoring the 
extent to which these institutions contribute to systemic risk.2  
There are multiple definitions of this term, but it generally refers 
to “the risk of a broad-based breakdown in the financial system, 
often realized as a series of correlated defaults among financial 
institutions, typically banks, that occurs over a short period of 
time and typically caused by a single major event.”3  As a result, 
the Dodd-Frank Act likely targeted hedge funds because they can 
potentially create a systemic risk event.4  More specifically, the 
failure of a particular fund could result in catastrophic effects on 
the entire economy because hedge funds have a symbiotic 
relationship with investment banks.5  They rely on these 
counterparties to employ significant amounts of leverage and 
engage in various derivatives transactions.6  Thus, they can 
expose these investment banks to excessive losses if a particular 
trade goes against the expectations of a hedge fund adviser.7   
 
2 Id. (The stated purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act are, “[t]o promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, [sic] to protect the American taxpayer by 
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and 
for other purposes.”). See generally Roberta S. Karmel, The Controversy over 
Systemic Risk Regulation, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 823 (2010) (providing an overview of 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s focus on systemic risk). 
3 Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008: Written 
Testimony of Andrew W. Lo Prepared for the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, 110th Cong. 3–4 (2008) (written testimony of Andrew Lo, Harris & Harris 
Group Professor, MIT Sloan School of Management) [hereinafter Written Testimony 
of Andrew Lo], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1301217. 
4 Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Hedge Fund Regulation 
on the Horizon—Don’t Shoot the Messenger (June 18, 2009) [hereinafter 
Commissioner Aguilar Speech], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2009/spch061809laa.htm. In this speech, Commissioner Aguilar states:  
In their current form, hedge funds pose a systemic risk threat to our 
financial system in several ways. First, hedge funds have such significant 
assets under management that some fear that the loss of one or more large 
firms could potentially reverberate throughout the capital markets. In 
addition, if a counterparty fails to effectively withstand a hedge fund loss, 
then the failure of the counterparty could itself threaten market stability. 
Id. 
5 Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds 1 (MIT Sloan Sch. of 
Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4535-05, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 671443. 
6 Commissioner Aguilar Speech, supra note 4. 
7 Id.; see also Chan et al., supra note 5, at 2. 
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Accordingly, Congress used the current political climate of 
ensuring financial stability to pull hedge funds under the 
umbrella of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).   
Since the Dodd-Frank Act8 is mostly focused on monitoring 
systemic risk, the new legislation leaves many of the investor 
protection issues created by the hedge fund industry unresolved.9  
Many researchers in this area agree with this approach10 and 
believe that investor protection is inapplicable since hedge funds 
are restricted to sophisticated investors, which are institutions or 
individuals who are required to maintain a certain financial net-
worth.11  This view is consistent with traditional notions of 
 
8 Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act is the section that regulates hedge funds. Dodd-
Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 401–16, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570–79 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The formal name of Title IV is the 
“Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010.” § 401, 124 Stat. at 
1570 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 80b–20 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). However, I will simply 
refer to the Dodd-Frank Act throughout this Article to avoid undue confusion. 
9 See generally infra Part II (explaining why the Dodd-Frank Act is mostly 
focused on systemic risk prevention). 
10 The following articles on this topic focus on systemic risk prevention: Gregory 
W. Brown et al., Are Hedge Funds Systemically Important? (Working Paper Series, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1689079;  
Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: Regulating 
Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 283 (2009); Jeffrey 
N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s 
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 
151 (2011); Written Testimony of Andrew Lo, supra note 3; Anne Rivière, The Future 
of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparative Approach: United States, United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263 (2011); 
Monica Billio et al., Crises and Hedge Fund Risk (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 07-
14, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1130742.  
11 The terms “sophisticated investor” and “accredited investor” will be used 
interchangeably within this Article. The term “accredited investor” is defined in the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15)(2006) and 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2011). 
The Dodd-Frank Act revised the accredited investor standard for natural persons so 
that the individual net worth of any natural person, or joint net worth with the 
spouse of that person, at the time of purchase, is more than $1,000,000 and excludes 
the value of the primary residence of such natural person. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2011)). The SEC must also periodically review this standard every four 
years to take inflation into consideration. § 413(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1577 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 77b). Knowledge is not a prerequisite for becoming an accredited 
investor. See § 413(a), 124 Stat. at 1577 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b). The other 
federal securities law exemptions that hedge funds rely on include heightened 
standards for determining the qualifications of sophisticated investors (for example, 
the “qualified purchaser” standard in the Investment Company Act of 1940), but 
these specific distinctions are not necessary for purposes of this Article.  
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investor protection, which reject the argument that investor 
protection principles should be expanded to hedge fund investors, 
since they can presumably “fend for themselves.”12  In contrast, 
this Article focuses on the need for greater protection of these 
investors since the hedge fund industry has morphed into its own 
distinct marketplace that has grown increasingly complex.   
As such, this Article specifically argues that the Dodd-Frank 
Act does not provide hedge fund investors with enough 
information to adequately protect themselves from the unique 
informational challenges associated with hedge fund 
investments.  These unique issues encompass an overall lack of 
standardization within the industry, particularly with respect to 
its disclosure practices, risk assessments and valuation 
procedures.  This lack of standardization, coupled with a limited 
public disclosure regime, makes it exceptionally difficult for 
investors to adequately investigate a particular hedge fund 
investment.  In addition, investors cannot effectively choose an 
optimal hedge fund investment because these informational 
challenges make it difficult to adequately compare a large range 
of hedge fund opportunities.  This severely limits investor choice 
and competition within the industry.  These informational 
challenges deserve heightened attention since the current 
economic downturn resulted in the failure of approximately 1,500 
hedge funds, which subsequently exposed such investors to 
staggering losses.13  There are approximately 18,000 hedge funds 
 
12 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). In this seminal case, the 
Supreme Court held that an offering to those who can “fend for themselves” is not a 
public offering and could therefore be exempt from federal securities regulation. Id.; 
see also, e.g., Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. 
REV. 681, 713–14 (2000) (arguing that hedge fund protection through federal 
legislation is unnecessary); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision To Regulate Hedge 
Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 
975, 990 (asserting that the government should not expand investors protection 
principles to hedge fund investors). 
13 David Reilly, Hedge Funds Get To Feel Like ‘Smart Guys’ Again: David  
Reilly, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aMIX3xXmjVHE; see 
also SWISS ANALYTICS, HEDGE FUND DUE DILIGENCE. . . MORE THAN JUST A 
BACKGROUND CHECK 1 (May 2009), available at 
http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/hedge-fund-due-diligence/2009/ 
20090507/Due_Diligence_More_Than_Just_Background_Check.pdf (indicating that 
approximately “2,000 hedge funds have closed . . . their doors since the onset of the 
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that reported performance in 2009,14 but this seems to be the 
only industry, with as many participants, which does not have an 
organizational or regulatory structure broadly supporting it.15   
Furthermore, the losses of hedge fund investors could 
adversely impact other market participants, as well as the 
overall securities markets.  For example, many pension plans, 
endowments, and insurance companies invest in hedge funds, 
which could expose their underlying constituents to excessive 
risks.16  The SEC also uses a significant amount of its resources 
to monitor the hedge fund industry, even though sophisticated 
investors are presumed to be sufficiently capable of protecting 
themselves.17  These costs could be mitigated if sophisticated 
investors were provided greater protections that would enable 
them to make better investment choices.18  Moreover, the overall 
stability of the entire economy can be adversely impacted by such 
losses since our markets our inextricably connected.19  The 
financial crisis provided a plethora of evidence on this point.20  
For these reasons, expanding investor protection principles to 
hedge fund investors is a pressing issue that will help to protect 
the overall integrity of our security markets.   
This Article presents an alternative regulatory approach 
that seeks to create uniform and mandatory measures of 
valuation and risk for these investment vehicles, which would 
resolve many of these unique informational challenges.21  These 
uniform valuation mechanisms would ensure that the fees and 
returns reported by hedge funds are reliable and fair.  In 
 
financial crisis and that as many as 2,000 more may follow suit over the next 18 
months”); Commissioner Aguilar Speech, supra note 4. 
14 PERTRAC FIN. SOLUTIONS, PERTRAC’S 2009 HEDGE FUND DATABASE STUDY 3 
(Mar. 2010), http://www.pertrac.com/per0020/web/localdata/WEB/DATA/ 
WEBSECTIONS]MATTACHMENT/PER0020_1368//PerTrac%202009%20Hedge%20
Fund%20Database%20Study.pdf. It is difficult to track the total number of hedge 
funds because there is no mandatory reporting framework that would require all 
such funds to register.  
15 RICHARD HORWITZ, HEDGE FUND RISK FUNDAMENTALS: SOLVING THE RISK 
MANAGEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY CHALLENGE 143 (2004).  
16 See infra Part IV.B. 
17 See infra Part IV.A. 
18 See infra Part IV.A. 
19 See infra Part IV.C. 
20 See infra Part IV.C. 
21 See generally infra Part V. 
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addition, these uniform risk measures would help such investors 
effectively compare and aggregate risks across a number of hedge 
funds.  They would also be tabulated and made available to 
interested sophisticated investors in a risk database.  This risk 
database would be constructed so that the proprietary holdings of 
hedge funds are protected.  This alternative framework would 
therefore provide more reliable and consistent disclosures to 
investors, while protecting the legitimate investing needs of 
hedge funds.  Moreover, mandating standardization across the 
entire industry could decrease systemic risk because enhancing 
investor choice and transparency inevitably leads to better 
functioning markets.   
Part I of this Article describes the basic hedge fund 
structure, explains the benefits that hedge funds can provide to 
the national securities markets and highlights the controversies 
that are frequently associated with these investment vehicles.  
Part II explains why the Dodd-Frank Act is mostly focused on 
systemic risk prevention as opposed to investor protection, and 
gives a broad overview of its relevant provisions.  It also 
demonstrates that the Dodd-Frank Act does little to increase 
investor protection.  For example, with respect to preventing 
hedge fund fraud, the exemptions provided under the act will 
limit the SEC’s ability to detect fraud within hedge funds where 
fraud is most likely to occur.  Part III identifies the unique 
investor protection issues that arise from hedge fund 
investments, such as the lack of standardized disclosure 
practices, risk calculations, and valuation mechanisms, and Part 
IV explains how the losses of sophisticated investors can impact 
other market participants, as well as the entire economy.  Part V 
then proposes an alternative regulatory framework which would 
eliminate certain exemptions and exclusions from the definition 
of “private fund” under the Dodd-Frank Act and create a new 
self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) that would: (1) establish 
certain standardized business practices for private funds so that 
hedge fund investors can adequately investigate and compare 
potential hedge fund investments; and (2) develop a risk 
database system that would resolve transparency issues and 
promote competition within the hedge fund industry, while 
protecting the legitimate investing needs of hedge funds.   
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I. BACKGROUND ON HEDGE FUNDS 
This Part is designed to give a general overview of hedge 
funds.  This section begins by describing the basic hedge fund 
structure and continues by explaining the various benefits that 
these investment vehicles can provide to its investors and to the 
national securities markets.  It concludes with a detailed 
explanation of the controversies associated with these vehicles 
that eventually led to increased regulation under the Dodd-
Frank Act. 
A. Hedge Fund Structure 
The term “hedge fund” is shrouded with mystery and 
obscurity, even though hedge funds account for over fifty percent 
of the trading volume on the New York and London stock 
exchanges.22  This intrigue is partially due to the fact that hedge 
funds have never been officially defined by any regulatory body.23  
It is difficult to create a single definition because the actual 
investment strategies of hedge funds are extremely 
heterogeneous.24  In their most basic form, hedge funds are 
investment vehicles that are formed by investment advisers who 
solicit money from a number of investors.25  In this regard, hedge 
funds are comparable to mutual funds, but they differ with 
respect to their registration status, legal structures, and 
investment constraints.26  Hedge fund advisers are typically 
experienced financial professionals who have developed a unique 
investment strategy that “guarantees” positive returns 
irrespective of market conditions.27  Hedge fund investors must 
be “sophisticated,” which means that each must either possess a 
 
22 Greg Ip & Henny Sender, Cash Machine: In Today’s Buyouts, Payday For 
Firms Is Never Far Away, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2006, at A1. 
23 See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (observing 
that securities laws do not define hedge fund); Registration Under the Advisers Act 
of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. 275 & 279) (“There is no statutory or regulatory definition of 
hedge fund . . . .”). 
24 FILIPPO STEFANINI, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES OF HEDGE FUNDS 2 (2006). 
25 GERALD T. LINS ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: 
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE § 1.1 (2010). 
26 Id. 
27 See id. §§ 1.2, 2.2. Such returns are generally referred to as “absolute 
returns.” Id. § 1.1. 
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certain level of financial wealth or be a certain type of institution 
in order to invest in such vehicles.28  Once the investment adviser 
gathers enough money from sophisticated investors to form a 
sizable pool of assets, the adviser then invests those assets into a 
range of instruments to fulfill the promise of absolute returns.  
The term “hedge” refers to the fact that they have historically 
used various strategies in order to hedge, or protect, their 
portfolios against market losses.29  For example, an investment 
adviser could simultaneously take long and short positions in the 
same type of instrument in order to ensure a return in both high 
and low markets.30  This was essentially how Alfred Winslow 
Jones structured the first hedge fund in 1949.31  He used short 
sales and leverage to create returns that had a low correlation to 
general market performance.32  Today, however, a multitude of 
hedge fund strategies exist, some of which may or may not hedge 
their investments.33   
Despite their prevalence in our markets, hedge funds have 
remained mostly unregulated prior to the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act.34  Since hedge fund investments are securities35 and 
 
28 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2006); 17 C.F.R § 230.501(a) 
(2011).  
29 See JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS 15 (2005). 
30 See id. at 12–15. 
31 STEFANINI, supra note 24. 
32 Id. 
33 See What is a Hedge Fund?, HENNESEE GRP. LLC, 
http://www.hennesseegroup.com/hedgefund/index.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
34 The SEC recently attempted to bring hedge funds under its umbrella by 
implementing the “Hedge Fund Rule” on December 10, 2004, which eliminated the 
“private advisers exemption” under the Advisers Act. Registration Under the 
Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. 275 & 279). This exemption was available to advisers who 
had fewer than fifteen clients and a single client typically included an entire hedge 
fund managed by an adviser as opposed to including each separate investor within 
such fund. See id. The Hedge Fund Rule rejected this interpretation of the word 
“client” by requiring advisers to count each individual investor within a fund, which 
made the private advisers exemption unavailable for many hedge fund advisers. Id. 
However, in Goldstein v. SEC, the court held that the Hedge Fund Rule was 
arbitrary and it exceeded the SEC’s rulemaking authority because its interpretation 
of the word “client” fell “outside the bounds of reasonableness” 451 F.3d 873, 881–83 
(D.C. Cir. 2006).  
35 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). The term “security” is 
defined under this section of the Securities Act. If an issuer offers securities as 
defined in this section, then such issuer must register its offering under the 
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pooled investment vehicles,36 they fall within the regulatory 
framework of the four federal securities laws which are: (1) The 
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”);37 (2) The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”);38 (3) The Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (“Company Act”);39 and (4) The Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”).40  However, most hedge 
funds rely on numerous exemptions provided under these laws so 
as to avoid the investment constraints and rigorous disclosure 
requirements that would result from registration.41  In order to 
comply with these exemptions, hedge funds are mostly restricted 
to sophisticated investors.42  This exclusion is supported by the 
notion that our government should not use its limited resources 
to protect sophisticated investors since they can use their own 
financial and institutional resources to gain comparable, if not 
superior protection.43  As a result, hedge funds retain greater 
flexibility in making investments as compared to mutual funds, 
their registered counterparts.44  For example, hedge funds are not  
 
 
Securities Act and file periodic disclosures under the Exchange Act, unless there is 
an available exemption. See id. § 77f(a). 
36 See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-3 (West 2011). The 
term “investment company” is defined in this section. If an issuer is an investment 
company as defined in this section, then such issues must comply with the terms 
under the Company Act and register under the Advisers Act, unless there is an 
available exemption. Id. at § 80a-8(a). 
37 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a–77aa (West 2011). 
38 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a–78pp (West 2011). 
39 Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (West 2011). 
40 Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-1 to -18c (West 2011). 
41 See SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO 
THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 11–33 (2003) 
[hereinafter IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf (providing a detailed 
discussion on the exemptions that hedge funds frequently rely on). 
42 See id. at ix–x. 
43 See id. at 12–13. 
44 The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (“The regulation is 
designed to minimize conflicts of interest that arise in these complex operations. The 
Act requires these companies to disclose their financial condition and investment 
policies to investors when stock is initially sold and, subsequently, on a regular 
basis. The focus of this Act is on disclosure to the investing public of information 
about the fund and its investment objectives, as well as on investment company 
structure and operations.”). See generally Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 to -64 
(West 2011) (the federal securities law that primarily regulates mutual funds). 
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required to adhere to any diversification policies and they can 
use their assets to retain large cash positions instead of 
maintaining actual investments.45 
B. Benefits of Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds often provide numerous benefits to the national 
securities markets.  They can help to maintain market efficiency, 
facilitate capital formation, and provide liquidity to the national 
securities markets.46  For example, many hedge funds seek 
investment opportunities from undervalued securities, which can 
help move the actual price of such securities closer to their true 
values.47  In addition, hedge funds often make the securities 
markets more liquid through their significant participation in the 
buying and selling of securities.48  They are also willing 
purchasers of several types of derivatives, which can help other 
counterparties to reduce their own risks.49  Moreover, hedge 
funds can provide investors with a unique risk management 
opportunity to guarantee positive returns irrespective of market 
conditions.50  Sophisticated investors have consistently taken 
advantage of this opportunity, which is largely unavailable in 
other investment company structures.51 
C. Controversies Related to Hedge Funds  
1.  Leverage 
Despite the proposed benefits of hedge funds, there are many 
corresponding controversies that have often created a public 
outcry for the increased regulation of these vehicles.  One of the 
most controversial characteristics of hedge funds is their ability 
 
45 LINS ET AL., supra note 25, § 1.1. 
46 Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds, Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of 
Christopher Cox, Former Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter Christopher Cox Testimony], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts072506cc.htm. 
47 William A. Roach, Jr., Note, Hedge Fund Regulation: “What Side of the 
Hedges Are You on?” 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 165, 173 (2009). 
48 Id. at 174. 
49 Christopher Cox Testimony, supra note 46.  
50 Id. 
51 See id.  
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to employ unlimited amounts of leverage.52  Leverage refers to 
“the use of various financial instruments or borrowed capital, 
such as margin, to increase the potential return of an 
investment.”53  A typical leverage transaction occurs when a 
hedge fund adviser borrows a portion of the fund’s assets from a 
prime broker or investment bank.54  The use of leverage gives 
advisers the ability to increase returns of a particular fund, 
without having to increase the actual amount of capital 
invested.55  Conversely, the use of excessive leverage could cause 
the losses of a fund to exceed the actual amounts invested, which 
is the contributing factor to several recent hedge fund blow-ups.56  
More importantly, the use of excessive leverage could create a 
situation where a hedge fund failure leads to substantial losses 
for the prime-brokers and investment banks since the fund will 
not have enough equity to pay off its creditors.57   
The most widely-publicized hedge fund debacle occurred 
when Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”), a Connecticut 
based hedge fund, suffered significant losses in August 1998 
when Russia devalued the ruble.58  During this same time period, 
LTCM also had a balance-sheet leverage ratio that exceeded 25 
to 1.59  Thus, the primary trading counterparties, which included 
multiple banks and creditors, were the firms that were most  
 
 
 
52 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, 
HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
11–12 (1999) [hereinafter LTCM REPORT], available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf (specifies that the amount of 
leverage employed by a particular hedge fund is only limited to the extent requested 
by its actual counterparties). 
53 Leverage Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/ 
leverage.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
54 LINS ET AL., supra note 25, § 2:3.  
55 Leverage Definition, supra note 53. 
56 See Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, 30 
REGULATION 36, 40 (2007). 
57 LTCM REPORT, supra note 52, at 13, 17. 
58 Testimony Concerning Investor Protection Implications of Hedge Funds, 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 
(2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Former Chairman, SEC), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/041003tswhd.htm. 
59 LTCM REPORT, supra note 52, at 12. 
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exposed to LTCM’s losses.60  This phenomenon was further 
explained by Roger Lowenstein, a reputable financial journalist, 
who stated that  
If [LTCM] defaulted, all of the banks in the room would be left 
holding one side of a contract for which the other side no longer 
existed . . . . Undoubtedly, there would be a frenzy as every 
bank rushed to escape its now one-sided obligations and tried to 
sell its collateral from [LTCM].”61 
2. Derivatives 
Hedge funds frequently rely on derivatives to ensure positive 
returns irrespective of market conditions.62  However, they are 
often considered to be riskier financial instruments than 
securities.63  By way of background, a derivative is “a financial 
instrument whose value derives from that of something else.”64  
That “something else” could be a physical commodity, a security, 
or even a price index, and these instruments are referred to as 
the “underlier[s]” of derivatives contracts.65  Futures are a 
common example of a derivatives contract where, “a party agrees 
to either buy or sell an underlying commodity or security at a 
specified price on a specified date in the future.”66  Other familiar 
examples of derivatives instruments include forwards, swaps, 
and options.  Hedgers use futures contracts to protect against the 
risk of price fluctuations within various markets, while 
speculators use futures contracts to profit from inefficiencies 
within those same markets.67  Essentially, speculators make a 
prediction of what the price of a particular commodity or 
instrument may be at some future date.  They then use futures, 
or other types of derivatives, to profit from the probability of 
their prediction actually coming true.68  If their predictions are 
 
60 Id. at 13. 
61 ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, at xix (2000). 
62 MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES: THE EASY WAY TO GET STARTED 
3–5 (2006). 
63 See, e.g., id. at 5.  
64 Id. at 3. 
65 Id. at 1. 
66 Id. at 25. 
67 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 190 (11th ed. 2009). 
68 DURBIN, supra note 62, at 5. 
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accurate, then speculators earn substantial profits.69  Conversely, 
if their predictions are wrong, then they suffer significant 
losses.70  
Additionally, derivatives transactions usually constitute a 
“zero-sum game” where one party’s gains depend on the other 
party’s equivalent losses.71  Thus, a party engaging in a 
derivatives transaction can either earn handsome profits or lose 
more than one hundred percent of their initial investment.  
Conversely, an investment in a security either increases or 
decreases in value, but rarely causes the investor to lose one 
hundred percent of its initial investment.  Due to these 
heightened risks of investing in derivatives instruments, they are 
often associated with numerous hedge fund failures and other 
systemic risk events.72  Warren Buffet’s firm reiterated this view 
in its 2002 annual report which states that “derivatives are 
financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, 
while now latent, are potentially lethal.”73  Several types of 
complex derivatives transactions also caused the failure of 
several notable financial institutions during the most recent 
financial crisis.74 
3. Liquidity 
Hedge fund investments are also significantly less liquid 
than mutual fund investments.  In this case, liquidity refers to 
the ease through which an investor can redeem its total 
investment from an investment vehicle.  While mutual funds 
usually permit redemptions on a daily basis, hedge funds often 
require thirty to ninety day notice periods for investor 
 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Zero-Sum Game Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/z/zero-sumgame.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
72 See, e.g., BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 67, at 188. 
73 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT (2003), available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf. 
74 See generally The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before 
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Prof. 
Michael Greenberger, Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law), available at 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310175404/http://c0182412.cdn1.clou
dfiles.rackspacecloud.com/2010-0630-Greenberger.pdf. 
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redemptions.75  Some hedge funds can even lock-up an investor’s 
initial investment for one or more years.76  Thus, if a hedge fund 
investor wishes to redeem their money from a particular fund, 
they may be subject to lengthy lock-up periods that could expose 
an investor to increased losses.  These limited liquidity rights, 
combined with the sometimes riskier investment activities of 
hedge funds, could create undue risk for hedge fund investors.  
 
4. Fees 
The fee structures employed by hedge fund advisers are also 
unique because they typically receive a performance fee that is 
based on the actual profits earned by a fund.77  Some critics argue 
that receiving a performance fee could increase the likelihood of 
advisers engaging in riskier investments to guarantee a profit, 
especially since such advisers will not incur an equivalent loss in 
personal earnings, if the overall fund incurs a loss.78  However, 
some supporters argue that aligning the interests of the adviser 
with its investors reduces many of the agency problems 
associated with such arrangements, especially when the adviser 
also invests a portion of its own money into the fund.79  These 
fees are generally calculated as a percentage of a fund’s net asset 
value.80  Furthermore, as will be discussed in Section III below, 
there is no standardized mechanism for calculating hedge fund 
valuations, which is the primary component of a fund’s net asset 
value.81  Thus, unscrupulous hedge fund advisers could 
fraudulently inflate a fund’s valuations to increase their 
performance fees.82  
 
75 Henry Ordower, The Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and State 
Funds, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 311 (Supp. 2010). 
76 NICHOLAS, supra note 29, at 44. 
77 NICHOLAS, supra note 29, at 46. Hedge fund advisers also receive a fixed fee, 
which is based on a percentage of a fund’s net asset value.  Mutual fund advisers 
also receive these fixed fees. Id. 
78 Ordower, supra note 75, at 312.  
79 Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial 
Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 240, 276–79 (2009). 
80 Ordower, supra note 75, at 312. 
81 Id. at 311–12. 
82 Id. at 312–13. 
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II. SYSTEMIC RISK FOCUS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
Part I highlights some, but not all, of the controversies 
associated with hedge fund investments.  These issues can be 
alleviated by laws that would decrease systemic risk, as well as 
increase investor protection.  While the Dodd-Frank Act attempts 
to resolve some of these issues, its primary focus is limited to 
preventing systemic risk.83  This leaves many of the investor 
protection issues unresolved.84  As such, this Part begins by 
explaining why the Dodd-Frank Act is primarily focused on 
systemic risk prevention and continues by giving a general 
overview of the Dodd-Frank Act’s relevant provisions.  This 
section concludes by explaining why the Dodd-Frank Act will 
have a minimal impact on the protection of hedge fund investors. 
A. Reasons for Systemic Risk Focus 
Systemic risk generally refers to “the risk of a broad-based 
breakdown in the financial system, often realized as a series of 
correlated defaults among financial institutions, typically banks, 
that occurs over a short period of time and typically caused by a 
single major event.”85  Systemic risk can be mitigated by laws 
that impose minimum capital requirements, leverage limits, and 
investment constraints on institutions whose failure would 
warrant government intervention.  Much of the current 
literature on this topic analyzes how the activities of hedge funds 
can contribute to systemic risk.86  Since hedge funds have a 
symbiotic relationship with banks, the losses of hedge funds 
could adversely affect the holdings of banks, and thus increase 
the likelihood of a systemic risk event.87  The near failure of 
LTCM is an example of a systemic risk event caused by a single 
hedge fund.88   
Systemic risk has recently gained widespread attention since 
the financial meltdown resulted in a number of bank failures and 
government bailouts that shattered our economic stability.  In 
 
83 See infra Part II (explaining why the Dodd-Frank Act is mostly focused on 
systemic risk prevention). 
84 See infra Part IV (discussing the need for additional investor protection). 
85 Written Testimony of Andrew Lo, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
86 See supra text accompanying note 10. 
87 Chan et al., supra note 5. 
88 Id. at 20, 56. 
WF_Martin (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2012  5:28 PM 
102 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:87   
 
response to the financial crisis, Congress created the 
Congressional Oversight Panel which is “empowered to hold 
hearings, review official data, and write reports on actions taken 
by Treasury and financial institutions and their effect on the 
economy.”89  In January 2009, the Congressional Oversight Panel 
issued a special report that analyzed the current state of the 
regulatory system and made specific recommendations for 
regulatory reform.90  Many of the recommendations within this 
report focused on identifying and regulating financial institutions 
that pose a systemic risk to the economy.91  In September 2009, 
the SEC created the new Division of Risk, Strategy, and 
Financial Innovation to investigate and analyze issues involving 
systemic risk.92  Previously, the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury Department were the government entities that were 
primarily responsible for addressing systemic risk, while the 
SEC’s primary focus was investor protection.93  Since the 
financial meltdown brought systemic risk to the forefront of the 
political agenda, the Dodd-Frank Act mostly incorporates 
provisions that could mitigate systemic risk.  
B. Overview of Dodd-Frank Act 
1. Registration Under the Advisers Act 
The Dodd-Frank Act will require many hedge fund advisers 
to register under the Advisers Act, which is the federal 
legislation that regulates the advisers of pooled investment 
vehicles.94  The Advisers Act imposes certain disclosure 
 
89 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY 
REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM:  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND 
ENSURING STABILITY 51 (Jan. 2009), http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-
report-regulatoryreform.pdf [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY 
REFORM].   
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 22–23. 
92 Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation Overview, SEC, 
www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin.shtml (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).  
93 Paredes, supra note 12, at 990. 
94 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). The Dodd-Frank Act has also created a 
new regulatory framework for the OTC market. §§ 701–774, 124 Stat. at 1641–802 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, & 15 U.S.C.). This regime could 
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requirements on registered advisers such as descriptions of the 
advisory services offered, material conflicts of interest, any 
pending disciplinary actions, advisory fees charged, and other 
general business descriptions.95  It also subjects advisers to 
additional fiduciary obligations and certain record-keeping 
requirements.96  The SEC conducts random inspections of 
registered advisers to ensure that they are in compliance with 
the Advisers Act.97  According to the SEC, the Advisers Act, and 
its corresponding regulations, are designed to protect investors, 
even though the SEC will likely use the information gathered 
from registered advisers to assess systemic risk.98   
In effect, the Dodd-Frank Act eliminates the private-adviser 
exemption that hedge fund advisers previously relied on in order 
to avoid registration under the Advisers Act.99  Moreover, all 
hedge funds that fall within the new definition of “private fund” 
will have to register under the Advisers Act.100  A private fund is 
defined as any issuer that would be an investment company, as 
defined in the Company Act,101 but for sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of 
that Act.102  Thus, if a hedge fund previously relied on the 
exemptions set forth in sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Company 
Act, then it must register under the Advisers Act.103  Under 
section 3(c)(1) of the Company Act, if a hedge fund has less than 
one hundred beneficial owners, then it is not required to register 
under the Company Act.104  Under section 3(c)(7), if hedge funds 
 
subject hedge funds that trade OTC derivatives to additional reporting requirements 
and certain capitalization and leverage requirements as Swap Dealers (SDs) or 
Major Swap Participants (MSPs). § 727–30, 124 Stat. at 1696–702. However, the 
application of these standards to hedge fund advisers is unclear until the SEC issues 
additional guidance on the actual definitions of SDs and MSPs. §§ 721(a)(33), 
721(a)(49), 124 Stat. at 1658.  
95 See Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-4 (c)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/laws.shtml#invadvact1940 (last visited on Sept. 12, 2012).  
99 See Dodd-Frank Act, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
100 Id.  
101 Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
102 Dodd-Frank Act, § 402, 124 Stat. at 1570 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(29) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
103 See id.; § 403 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(1)). 
104 Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-3(c)(1) (West 2011). 
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limit their investments to “qualified purchasers,” then they are 
also exempt from the registration requirements of the Company 
Act.105  Presumably, Congress used this convoluted definition of 
private fund to capture the large number of hedge funds that rely 
on sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Company Act in order to 
avoid the arduous requirements that normally apply to mutual 
funds.  
2.  Exemptions and Exclusions from Registration Under the 
Advisers Act 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress also adopted various 
exemptions from registration under the Advisers Act for certain 
private funds.106  As a result, the SEC and the investors of such 
funds will not receive the standard disclosures that would be 
mandated under the Advisers Act.107  Congress directs the SEC to 
exempt advisers that only advise private funds and have assets 
under management in the United States of less than 
$150,000,000.108  In addition, managed futures funds109 and other 
funds that hold a limited amount of securities are not “private 
funds” under the Dodd-Frank Act, and thus are not required to 
be registered.110  Family offices,111 venture capital funds,112 and 
certain foreign advisers113 will also be exempt from registration.   
 
 
105 § 80a-3(c)(7)(A). 
106 Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 407–410, 124 Stat. 1376, 1574–76 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l)(1), -3(m)(1), -2(a)(11), -3(n) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
107 Dodd-Frank Act § 404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(2)(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
108 Dodd-Frank Act, § 408, 124 Stat. 1376, 1575 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). However, these funds are still 
required to maintain certain records and provide certain reports as the SEC deems 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest. § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575 (codified as 
amended at 15 US.C. § 80b-3(m)(2)).  
109 LINS ET AL., supra note 25, at § 11.1 (defining “managed futures fund[s]” as 
“funds [that] actively trade commodity futures and options on futures”). 
110 § 403, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)).  
111 § 409, 124 Stat. at 1575 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(G)).  
112 § 407, 124 Stat. at 1574 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l)(1)). 
113 § 403, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3)). 
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3. Collection of Systemic Risk Data 
Under the Dodd Frank Act, all registered investment 
advisers to private funds, including certain exempt advisers, may 
be required to provide additional disclosures to the SEC beyond 
the specific disclosures requirements set forth under the Advisers 
Act.114  It seems that these disclosures are designed to help the 
SEC identify whether certain hedge funds pose a systemic risk to 
the economy.115  However, the SEC has not yet defined systemic 
risk or identified ways in which systemic risk can be measured.  
More specifically, every investment adviser may be required to 
file with the SEC a description of its assets under management, 
use of leverage, counterparty credit exposure, trading and 
investment positions, valuation policies and practices, types of 
assets held, and “such other information as the 
Commission . . . determines is necessary and appropriate in the 
public interest and for the protection of investors or for the 
assessment of systemic risk . . .”116  The SEC essentially has 
broad discretion to collect any information it deems necessary in 
order to protect the public interest.  Yet, investors will not have 
access to this information.  The SEC is supposed to guarantee 
that the information is kept in confidence and only disclosed to 
Congress or to other regulators.117  However, in the Managed 
Funds Association’s (“MFA”) response to this particular provision 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, they stated that 
[s]uch information is highly sensitive from a competitive 
standpoint and advisers to private investment funds employ 
substantial safeguards to protect the proprietary and 
confidential information of the funds they manage, including 
 
114 § 404, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(3)). 
Certain mid-sized funds, presumably including certain funds that would be exempt 
pursuant to section 408 of the Act (exempts advisers who have less than $150 
million under management), could be subject to these additional reporting 
requirements if they pose a systemic risk to the economy. § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1)). 
115 See § 404, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
4(b)(1)(A)). Hedge funds that pose a systemic risk could also be identified as 
“Designated Companies” by the new “Oversight Council” which would subject them 
to additional reporting requirements and investment constraints. Id. An analysis of 
this provision is irrelevant for purposes of this Article, which is confined to investor 
protection issues.  
116 § 404 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(3)(H)). 
117 § 404 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § (b)(7)(B)). 
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information related to their investment strategies, portfolio 
holdings and investor base.  It is also critical that sensitive 
investor information that may be reported by an adviser be 
protected by the SEC.  Public disclosure of confidential investor 
information could cause potential harm to those investors.118 
Thus, the MFA, as well as many other market participants, 
is concerned that the improper dissemination of this information 
could actually harm hedge fund investors if a third party 
replicates the strategy of a particular hedge fund.119 
C. Limited Impact on Investor Protection 
The second category of the controversies associated with 
hedge fund investments relate to investor protection, which is the 
cornerstone of our federal securities laws.  These laws generally 
seek to protect investors by giving them the necessary tools to 
make better investment decisions.120  More specifically, these 
laws ensure investor protection by (1) deterring investment 
advisers from participating in fraudulent investment activities; 
(2) providing investors with more information and greater 
transparency to make better investment decisions since private 
actors may not have an incentive to disclose all pertinent 
information especially in easily compared form; and/or 
(3) providing regulators with more information and greater 
efficiency to better detect investment fraud.121  Since hedge funds 
are still restricted to sophisticated investors, the Dodd-Frank Act 
has a limited focus on enhancing investor protection.  This is 
consistent with traditional views on this topic, which assume 
that sophisticated investors are sufficiently capable of protecting 
themselves.122  While the Dodd-Frank Act will require many 
 
118 Letter from Richard H. Baker, President & CEO, Managed Funds Assoc., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.managedfunds.org/downloads/MFA%20SEC%20Letter.9.22.10.pdf. 
119 Id. 
120 See Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(b) (2006). 
121 See id. § 77q (making it unlawful to use fraud or deceit in the sale of 
securities); see also id. §§ 77k, 77l (creating civil liability for false information in 
registration statements and prospectuses); id. §§ 77j, 77e (listing the requirements 
for a prospectus and prohibiting the use of any means of interstate commerce in the 
absence of conformity with such requirements); id. §§ 77g, 77aa (listing disclosure 
requirements for registration statements). 
122 See infra Part IV.A. 
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hedge fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act, this 
section explains how this new requirement has a minimal impact 
on investor protection.  Furthermore, the various loopholes 
created for this new registration requirement create additional 
limitations. 
1. Limited Effect of Advisers Act Registration 
The Advisers Act subjects advisers to certain disclosure and 
record-keeping requirements with respect to their overall 
advisory businesses, but it has a limited effect on the specific 
activities of their respective funds.123  In contrast, registration 
under the Company Act would give investors more information to 
make better investment choices.  More specifically, it would 
subject registered funds to more rigorous disclosure 
requirements, investment constraints, and standardized business 
practices with respect to their actual trading activities.124  
However, the Dodd-Frank Act does not require hedge funds to 
register under the Company Act or impose any other comparable 
restrictions.  As a result, the overall impact of the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s provisions on investor protection is minimal. 
Advisers Act registration will likely enhance investor 
protection by giving the SEC, and perhaps investors, more 
information to better detect fraud.  It will also subject registered 
advisers to random SEC audits, which could serve as a deterrent 
to fraudulent investment activities.  However, SEC Chairman 
Mary Schapiro recently stated that “[g]iven the SEC’s limited 
resources, we have only been able to examine roughly 10 percent 
of the investment advisers registered with us in each of the last 
two years. The result is that many advisers registered with the 
SEC are not examined regularly.”125  This statement indicates 
 
123 See, e.g., Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-3 (discussing registration of 
investment advisers), 80b-4 (discussing reporting by investment advisers) (West 
2011). 
124 See, e.g., Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-8 (discussing registration of 
investment companies), 80a-12 (limiting functions and activities of investment 
companies), 80a-14 (regulating size of investment companies), 80a-29 (discussing 
reporting and financial statements of investment companies and their affiliated 
persons) (West 2011). 
125 Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Opening Statement at the SEC Open 
Meeting: Items 1 and 2—Proposals to Implement Investment Adviser Provisions of 
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that ensuring compliance under the Advisers Act is a costly and 
timely endeavor and as a result, fraudulent advisers have slipped 
through the cracks.  The most notable example of a fraudulent 
adviser “slipping through the cracks” would be Bernard Madoff, 
who swindled over $50 billion from sophisticated investors, even 
though he was registered under the Advisers Act.126  Relatedly, 
the various exemptions provided under the Dodd-Frank Act will 
probably make it difficult for the SEC to detect hedge fund fraud 
in funds where fraud is likely to occur.127 
2. Smaller Funds Escape Regulatory Oversight 
Hedge fund advisers with less than $150 million in assets in 
the United States under management will not have to register 
under the Advisers Act and consequently, investors within these 
funds will not be given the same protections.128  The SEC will 
still retain its power to collect systemic risk data from these 
exempt funds, but this information will not be given to 
investors.129  As a result, private funds that fall within this 
category could potentially be subject to oversight by the SEC, to 
the extent that they pose a systemic risk to the economy.  
However, it is not yet clear how the SEC intends to regulate such 
private funds or whether the SEC will even gather systemic risk 
data from any mid-sized funds that fall within this category.130  
 
the Dodd-Frank Act (Nov. 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2010/spch111910mls-items1-2.htm. 
126 David Ellis, Congress Looks for Answers in Madoff Scandal, 
CNNMONEY.COM (Jan. 5, 2009, 5:49 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/05/news/companies/madoff_hearing/index.htm. See 
also Kara Scannell, States Will Be Hedge-Fund Police, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2010, at 
C3. 
127 See infra Part II.C.2. 
128 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
129 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
130 On November 19, 2010, the SEC issued a proposed rule that would require 
exempt reporting advisers to also publicly disclose basic identifying information, 
certain business activities that create conflicts of interest, the adviser’s disciplinary 
history, and other information regarding the private funds that they advise. See 
Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with Less 
than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, 75 
Fed. Reg. 77,190, 77,206–10 (Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 275) 
[hereinafter SEC Proposal]. This new reporting requirement will not exempt such 
advisers from other reporting requirements mandated under their respective states. 
Id. at 77,192. 
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Congress probably excluded these mid-sized funds from actual 
registration under the Advisers Act because of its focus on 
systemic risk, since smaller funds are less likely to create a 
systemic risk event.131 
However, with respect to investor protection issues, some 
studies have found that smaller funds are much more likely to 
commit investment adviser fraud.132  In fact, according to the 
Alternative Investment Management Association (“AIMA”), most 
hedge fund fraud cases involved advisers with $25,000,000 under 
management.133  Furthermore, smaller funds are probably more 
likely to commit investment adviser fraud134 because larger hedge 
funds, which are more established within the hedge fund 
industry, are subject to heightened scrutiny from institutional 
investors.135  Smaller hedge funds generally do not attract as 
many institutional investors as compared to their larger 
counterparts.136  This is relevant because institutional investors 
tend to perform more due diligence on their hedge fund 
investments than individual high net-worth investors.137  This 
heightened due diligence process inevitably holds such advisers 
to a higher standard since their business practices are being 
more closely scrutinized.  In effect, if a hedge fund has a large 
number of institutional investors that are demanding more 
disclosures and greater transparency, then such advisers are less 
likely to commit in fraudulent investment activities. 
 
131 See SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 89, at 22–24. 
132 See Matthew Lewis, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of 
American and British Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 372 
(2008); Anuj Gangahar, SEC Rule Ignores Highest-Risk Category of Fund Fraud, 
FIN. NEWS (Oct. 31, 2005), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2005-10-31/sec-rule-
ignores-highest-risk-category-of-fund-fraud. 
133 Gangahar, supra note 132. 
134 See id.; Scannell, supra note 126 (discussing how fraud is more likely to 
happen with small managers than with larger managers). 
135 See Netty Ismail, Institutions Damp Hedge Fund ‘Startup Spirit,’ Citi’s Roe 
Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-
21/hedge-funds-startups-slow-as-investors-demand-track-record-citigroup-says.html 
(discussing institutional investors’ preference for large hedge funds). 
136 Id.; Amanda Cantrell, Hedge Funds: A $25 Million Loophole: The New Hedge 
Fund Rule Exempts Small Funds, and That Could Be Bad for Small Investors, 
CNNMONEY.COM (Aug. 5, 2005, 2:20 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/05/markets/hedge_regulation/index.htm. 
137 See Lewis, supra note 132, at 368. 
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In addition, advisers with less than $100 million of assets 
under management will not qualify for federal registration and 
will thus be subject to regulation by each respective state.138  
However, the majority of hedge funds in existence have less than 
$50 million in assets.139  Previously, advisers with less than $25 
million in assets under management were delegated to the state 
regulation.140  Many state regulators do not have the adequate 
experience and/or resources to effectively regulate such a large 
number of advisers.141  This will of course further limit the 
likelihood of the detection of fraudulent behavior by state 
regulators, which is exacerbated by the fact that such smaller 
funds are less likely to have institutional investors that perform 
“internal” regulation as briefly discussed above.  This can also be 
problematic from an investor’s perspective because this will 
result in inconsistent disclosure for a large number of hedge 
funds.  As a result, it will be more difficult for hedge fund 
investors to compare disclosures among hedge funds, even 
though the SEC highlighted this as being an important concern 
for hedge fund investors. 
3. Some Futures Funds Escape Regulatory Oversight 
Traditional futures funds and other funds that hold a limited 
amount of securities are not “private funds” under the Dodd-
Frank Act, and thus are not required to register.142  These funds 
are commonly referred to as “managed futures” funds and they 
actively trade commodity futures and options on futures.143  
Managed futures funds are excluded because they are primarily 
regulated by of the Commodities Futures Trade Commission  
 
 
 
 
 
138 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 410, 124 Stat. 1376, 1576 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
139 HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 168. 
140 Scannell, supra note 126. 
141 Id. (discussing how the states do not “have the budget or the manpower” to 
monitor newly registered advisers). 
142 Dodd-Frank Act § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
143 LINS ET AL., supra note 25, § 11:1. 
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(“CFTC”), which is the designated regulatory body for the futures 
industry.144  Conversely, the SEC is the designated regulatory 
body for the securities industry.145   
The exclusion of managed futures funds from registration 
under the Advisers Act was probably created in order to avoid 
duplicative registration of hedge fund advisers by both the CFTC 
and the SEC, even though the SEC previously disagreed with 
this position.146  Duplicative regulation issues arise for hedge 
fund advisers who trade in both securities and futures markets.  
Despite the appropriate concerns regarding duplicative 
regulation, there are also exemptions that managed futures 
funds can rely on in order to avoid registration with both the 
CFTC and the SEC which would in effect, exempt such managed 
futures funds from any regulatory oversight. 147  The Dodd-Frank 
Act attempts to limit duplicative regulation by requiring the 
CFTC and the SEC to jointly promulgate rules governing 
reporting requirements for advisers that are dually-registered,  
 
 
 
 
144 Id. 
145 See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC (last modified July 30, 
2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 
146 The SEC previously addressed this issue in its adopting release for the Hedge 
Fund Rule, which has since been repealed. Registration Under the Advisers Act of 
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,065 (Dec. 10, 2004). In this 
release, the SEC noted:  
We disagree that our oversight of hedge fund advisers that are also 
commodity pool operators would be duplicative. Most hedge fund portfolios 
consist primarily of securities, and the CFTC’s oversight necessarily 
focuses more on the area of futures trading, which is the activity of most 
concern to the CFTC. It would be inconsistent with principles of functional 
regulation and contrary to the design and purpose of the 2000 amendments 
to the Advisers Act for the Commission not to oversee hedge fund advisers 
whose primary business is acting as an investment adviser. 
Id.  
147 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.13(a)(3), 4.13(a)(4), 4.7 (West 2011). The CFTC has recently 
proposed rescinding and/or limiting certain of these CFTC exemptions, but this 
proposal has not yet been deemed final as of October 2011. Commodity Pool 
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors: Amendments to Compliance 
Obligations; Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 7976 (Feb. 11, 2011), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2011-
2437a.pdf. 
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but it does not purport to address the regulatory loopholes for 
hedge fund advisers that are exempt from both regulatory 
agencies.148 
The exclusion of exempt futures funds from regulatory 
oversight can be problematic for two reasons.  First, there has 
been exponential growth of the number of traded futures over the 
past ten years.149  If the futures industry continues to follow this 
trajectory, then the number of managed futures funds could be 
expected to grow which could create a substantial loophole for 
such advisers.  Second, futures contracts are traded using 
margin, which is basically another form of leverage.  Margin 
“refers to the initial deposit of ‘good faith’ made into an account 
in order to enter into a futures contract.”150  The amount of 
margin required to secure a futures position is usually 5% to 10% 
of the actual cash value of the contract.151  As a result, if the 
closing price of a futures contract moves slightly away from an 
adviser’s expectations, this can produce enormous losses 
compared to such adviser’s initial margin deposit.152  This could 
possibly lead to a situation where a fund’s losses exceed the 
amount of capital invested in a particular fund, which would 
inevitably lead to a fund’s failure.153  Since trading in the futures 
market subjects investors to an increased risk of losing their total 
investment, it seems logical that managed futures funds should 
be subject to increased regulatory oversight.  More importantly, 
in the event that a fund’s losses exceed the amount of capital in a 
futures fund, the banks that extended lines of credit to the hedge 
fund to let it use leverage are going to incur such loss,154 which 
further increases the likelihood of systemic risk. 
By and large, the Dodd-Frank Act has a limited impact on 
investor protection.  This is made evident by the numerous 
loopholes that were created from the new registration 
 
148 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 406, 124 Stat. 1376, 1574 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(2)(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
149 STEFANINI, supra note 24, at 224. 
150 Futures Fundamentals: Characteristics Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/futures/futures4.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 
2012). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 See LTCM REPORT, supra note 52, at 12. 
154 STEFANINI, supra note 24, at 223. 
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requirement, as well as the minimal effect that Advisers Act 
registration has on investor protection.  The Dodd-Frank Act was 
likely focused on mitigating systemic risk, which leaves the more 
complicated investor protection issues unresolved. 
III. UNIQUE INVESTOR PROTECTION ISSUES THAT ARE NOT 
CAPTURED BY THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
This Part describes the unique investor protection issues 
that hedge fund investors typically encounter and that are not 
resolved by the Dodd-Frank Act.  These issues involve the 
growing complexity of the hedge fund industry as well as the 
industry’s overall lack of standardization with respect to its 
disclosure practices, risk calculations, and valuation 
mechanisms.  These issues make it exceptionally difficult for 
such investors to adequately assess the risk of a particular hedge 
fund investment.  In effect, this Part gives a detailed description 
of each of these issues. 
A. Inability To Properly Assess Risk 
Some academics have assumed that investor protection 
principles should not be expanded to hedge fund investors since 
many sophisticated investors spend anywhere from two to over 
six months performing due diligence on a particular hedge 
fund.155  Through this due diligence process, such investors 
receive information that would otherwise be disclosed if such 
hedge fund were registered.  However, in a study that was 
 
155 Paredes, supra note 12, at 992–93. This article also specifies that,  
[a] 2004 study by Deutsche Bank found that nearly 40% of the hedge fund 
investors surveyed spend an average of three to six months doing diligence 
before investing, with 20% of those surveyed spending an average of six 
months or more on diligence. Merely 3% of investors surveyed said they 
spend less than one month doing diligence. Only 21% of Deutsche Bank’s 
respondents said that they normally invest in a fund at its inception, with 
the remaining 79% presumably waiting for the fund to develop a track 
record to gauge performance. Pension plans reported, on average, that they 
annually meet with about forty hedge fund managers in making only one to 
three allocations, and the average for endowments was to interview about 
ninety hedge fund managers a year to make just four to six allocations. 
Managers of so-called “funds of hedge funds” reported that they sometimes 
interview over 400 hedge fund managers to make just fifteen or so 
allocations. 
Id. 
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conducted by the United States Government Accountability 
Office on May 7, 2009, “some market participants suggested that 
not all prospective investors have the capacity or retain the 
expertise to analyze the information they receive from hedge 
funds.”156  
Many of the underlying financial instruments that are 
traded by hedge funds have also become increasingly complex.  
While some hedge funds employ low-risk trading strategies that 
are relatively straightforward, other funds depend on high-risk 
trading strategies that rely on complex derivatives to ensure 
positive returns.  For instance, a computer program could take 
days to value certain collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”),157 
which are investment vehicles that offer securitized interests in a 
pool of loan or debt instruments.158  Similarly, collateralized 
mortgage obligations, which are investment vehicles that offer 
securitized interests in a pool of mortgages,159 are so complex that 
counterparties within a CMO transaction could yield different 
values for the same CMO interest.160 
Also, since trading strategies of hedge funds tend to be 
dynamic, it can be challenging for sophisticated investors to 
properly assess the corresponding risk of these strategies.  More 
specifically, hedge funds can employ highly active strategies 
where they are allowed to trade varying quantities of 
instruments and leverage on a daily basis, and can alter their 
investment strategies with minimal notification to investors.161  
Accordingly, it is difficult for sophisticated investors to 
adequately assess their risk exposure to hedge fund investments 
 
156 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-677T, HEDGE FUNDS:  
OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT, COUNTERPARTY RISKS, AND INVESTMENT 
CHALLENGES 11 (2009) [hereinafter GAO STUDY], available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d09677t.pdf.  
157 Jennifer S. Taub, Enablers of Exuberance: Legal Acts and Omissions that 
Facilitated the Global Financial Crisis 2 (Vt. Law Sch., Working Paper Series, 2009), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1472190. 
158 Collateralized Debt Obligations Definition, RISKGLOSSARY.COM, 
http://www.riskglossary.com/link/collateralized_debt_obligation.htm (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2012). 
159 Collateralized Mortgage Obligations, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/tcmos.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2011).  
160 See CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TWO TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN:  EASY 
MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 39–40 (2008). 
161 See id. 
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that employ dynamic trading strategies, even if they spend a 
significant amount of time performing due diligence on a 
particular fund.  
B. Limited Transparency 
Hedge funds are not required to provide extensive 
disclosures to their investors, while mutual funds are required to 
deliver a prospectus to all investors under the Company Act.162  A 
prospectus contains “valuable information, such as the fund’s 
investment objectives or goals, principal strategies for achieving 
those goals, principal risks of investing in the fund, fees and 
expenses, and past performance.”163  Many hedge funds do 
provide certain disclosures in order to comply with the anti-fraud 
provisions under the Securities Act,164 Exchange Act165 and 
Advisers Act.166  Such anti-fraud provisions apply even when 
issuers are exempt from registration.167  Many funds also 
voluntarily provide additional disclosures to their investors 
because a number of sophisticated investors have started to 
demand greater transparency.168  However, the level and degree 
of such disclosure varies among funds and most do not disclose 
the specific investment positions within their portfolios due to 
the proprietary nature of their investments.169  This concern 
arises from the possibility of third parties replicating their 
strategies which could lead to significant losses for current hedge 
fund investors.170  In addition, smaller hedge funds are not bound 
 
162 Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, supra note 41, at 43; OFFICE OF 
INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC, MUTUAL FUNDS: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 18 
(2007) [hereinafter Mutual Fund Guide], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf.  
163 Id.  
164 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q (West 2011).  
165 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (West 
2011). 
166 Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-6 (West 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (West 
2011); Shadab, supra note 79, at 286. 
167 Shadab, supra note 79, at 286–87. 
168 Greg MacSweeney, Investors Demand Hedge Fund Transparency, WALL 
STREET & TECH. (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/asset-
management/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=221600610. 
169 Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A 
Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 315–
16 (2007). 
170 Id. at 316. 
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by comparable demands for transparency because they are less 
likely to attract larger institutional investors that have greater 
bargaining power.171  Thus, while some larger institutional 
investors are able to bargain for greater transparency, other 
smaller investors are left to fend for themselves in a marketplace 
that has grown increasingly complex.   
C. Inability To Adequately Compare Various Hedge Fund 
Investments 
Regulators often rely on mandatory disclosure, or other 
comparable reporting mechanisms, as a tool for optimizing 
investor protection.  A mandatory disclosure regime forces a firm 
to provide relevant information to its regulators, which would 
help them to better detect investment adviser fraud.  It also 
ensures that investors have access to more reliable information 
regarding their investments so that they can make more 
informed investment decisions.172  The arguments in favor of a 
mandatory disclosure regime often focus on the limitations of a 
voluntary disclosure regime.  For example, firms may not have a 
great incentive to disclose relevant information voluntarily if 
such information would shed a negative light on the firm’s 
business.173  Even if information is disclosed voluntarily, they 
may have a self interest in only providing disclosure that would 
enhance their insider trading opportunities.174  In a similar vein, 
voluntary disclosures may not encompass pertinent information 
“coming from outside the disclosing firm.”175  Due to these 
reasons, mandatory disclosure is thought to improve investor 
welfare.176 
However, one of the least discussed benefits of mandatory 
disclosure, or other comparable reporting mechanisms, is the 
ability for investors to compare the financial and risk data among 
 
171 Cantrell, supra note 136. 
172 SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 27 (1981). 
173 STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
ANALYSIS 26 (2d ed. 2008). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
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various firms.177  The ability to compare firms is repeatedly 
stressed by the literature on financial statements analysis178 and 
as indicated by Professor Sharon Hannes, is arguably one of the 
most important aspects of a mandatory disclosure regime.179  As 
she accurately points out, if investors are not able to adequately 
compare the performance data and risk control practices of 
multiple firms, then it is difficult to ascertain whether a 
particular firm is competitive and whether it conforms to 
industry standards.180  For example, a return of 10% may appear 
favorable on its face, but if other comparable firms are earning 
returns of 15%, then the 10% return may not be optimal.  In 
order for this benefit of mandatory disclosure to accrue to 
investors, there of course needs to be a standardized format for 
calculating data as well as a public disclosure system, or some 
other comparable reporting mechanism, which would provide 
investors and other analysts with access to such data.181  
Moreover, the financial statements that are provided by hedge 
funds are not required to comply with generally accepted 
accounting principles or to be reviewed by a CPA.182 
With respect to public companies, Congress delegated 
authority to the SEC to promulgate finance reporting rules.183  
The SEC in turn has delegated this function to the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), which is the agency that 
 
177 Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify 
Mandatory Disclosure?, 29 J. CORP. L. 699, 702 (2004). 
178 See MARY BUFFET & DAVID CLARK, WARREN BUFFETT AND THE 
INTERPRETATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: THE SEARCH FOR THE COMPANY WITH 
A DURABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 73–74 (2008) (indicating that the financial 
statements of a company provide whether it offers a competitive advantage that will 
make for a good investment); ROBERT C. HIGGINS, ANALYSIS FOR FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT 6–11 (9th ed. 2009) (explaining the mechanism of financial statement 
analysis which is used by finance professionals to forecast performance and assess 
future opportunities); see generally MARK E. HASKINS, THE SECRET LANGUAGE OF 
FINANCIAL REPORTS: THE BACK STORIES THAT CAN ENHANCE YOUR INVESTMENT 
DECISIONS 171–87 (2008) (providing detailed guidance on how to engage in financial 
statement analysis to make better investment decisions). 
179 Hannes, supra note 177. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market 
Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 29 (2007). 
183 MARK E. HASKINS, THE SECRET LANGUAGE OF FINANCIAL REPORTS: THE 
BACK STORIES THAT CAN ENHANCE YOUR INVESTMENT DECISIONS 5 (2008). 
WF_Martin (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2012  5:28 PM 
118 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:87   
 
issues specific guidelines on how to report specific financial 
statement line items as well as any corresponding disclosures 
within any applicable footnotes.184  The FASB has also 
highlighted that uniform reporting standards contribute to better 
functioning markets.185  The FASB specifically stated that, 
“[Uniform] standards are important to the efficient functioning of 
the economy because decisions about the allocation of resources 
rely heavily on credible, concise, and understandable financial 
information.”186 
With respect to hedge fund industry, there is no 
standardized mechanism for managers to calculate valuations or 
to assess risk, which makes hedge fund comparisons extremely 
difficult for investors.  There is also no public disclosure regime, 
or other reporting mechanism, that would require all hedge funds 
to report such information.  This point is further exacerbated by 
the fact that hedge fund managers are prohibited from 
advertising, which means that they are forbidden from 
voluntarily disclosing relevant information to the public 
marketplace.187  Hedge fund investors primarily rely on hedge 
fund marketing activities, limited index reports, and extensive 
due diligence inspections as the main sources of information 
regarding these investments.188  As a result, the process for 
determining whether a hedge fund investment is optimal is 
expensive and unreliable.  This creates inefficiencies with respect 
to the value and quality of hedge fund investments, which is 
problematic since many institutional investors, such as pension 
plans, insurance companies, and endowments, see hedge funds as 
a valuable component of their underlying investment strategies.  
This is also problematic to the extent that hedge funds are 
 
184 Id. 
185 See Facts About FASB, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.fasb.org/ 
jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495 (last visited Sept. 13, 2012). 
186 Id. 
187 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2008). See Roel C. Campos, SEC Comm’r, Remarks 
Before the Hedge Fund Institutional Forum Corporate Funds Roundtable (Mar. 5, 
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030507rcc.htm 
(discussing the possibility of eliminating prohibition on advertising to promote 
transparency in hedge fund industry). 
188 See generally PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS: 
REPORT OF THE INVESTORS’ COMMITTEE TO THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON 
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2009), available at http://www.amaicmte.org/Public/ 
Investors%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf. 
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actually providing benefits to the overall marketplace by 
eradicating price inefficiencies, providing liquidity for various 
financial instruments, and by providing capital for new 
companies and industries.189  This issue deserves heightened 
attention since there are approximately 18,000 hedge funds in 
existence; although this number cannot be verified since there is 
no public disclosure regime, or other reporting mechanism, that 
will require all hedge funds to register.190  Overall, the hedge 
fund industry seems to be the only industry, with as many 
participants, that does not have an organizational or regulatory 
structure broadly supporting it.191 
In February 2007, the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets (“PWG”) released a set of principles and 
guidelines that were designed to assist regulators in the 
development of hedge fund regulations.192  The following 
“Investor Protection Principle” was included in this agreement: 
“Sophisticated investors that determine to invest in a private 
pool of capital should ensure that the size of their investment is 
consistent with their investment objectives and the principle of 
portfolio diversification.”193  However, this principle cannot be 
fully realized if sophisticated investors cannot adequately 
compare various hedge fund investments.  Since the Dodd-Frank 
Act does not include standardized valuation and risk practices, 
and will exempt many advisers from registration, investors will 
be limited in their abilities to optimize their hedge fund 
investments. 
 
189 GAO STUDY, supra note 156, at 13–14. 
190 PERTRAC’S 2009 HEDGE FUND DATABASE STUDY, supra note 14. 
191 HORWITZ, supra note 15. 
192 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, President’s Working Group  
Releases Agreement Detailing Common Approach to Private Pools of Capital (Feb. 
22, 2007), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 
20072221434566971.aspx. 
193 Agreement Among PWG and U.S. Agency Principals on Principles and 
Guidelines Regarding Private Pools of Capital, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 1–2, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hp272_principles.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2012) [hereinafter PWG Agreement]. 
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D. Lack of Standardized Valuation Mechanisms  
Valuation generally refers to the mechanisms through which 
a firm determines the current value of its assets.194  Since hedge 
fund managers are compensated based on the overall value of the 
fund’s assets, which in turn affects the performance results of a 
fund, there is a general concern that such managers have an 
incentive to inflate valuations.195  This issue is even more 
problematic with respect to hedge fund investments because they 
often trade illiquid assets for which there is no readily available 
market quotation.196  Moreover, hedge fund managers have great 
discretion to utilize their own valuation policies, as they are not 
required to use a third-party valuation agent or adhere to a 
standardized set of valuation policies.197  Most hedge fund 
offering materials do contain provisions that explain the 
manager’s valuation policies.  However, these provisions 
generally lack the specificity that investors need in order to 
effectively evaluate such policies.198  In addition, the hedge fund 
manager usually has discretion to deviate from the provided 
valuation policies when deemed necessary, making the 
disclosures even more ineffective.199 
Many academics, industry groups and even regulators have 
recognized the need for better hedge fund valuation policies and 
procedures.200  For example, the MFA, which is a leading 
advocate for sound business practices within the hedge fund 
industry, issued a best practices manual for hedge funds in 
 
194 Valuation Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/ 
valuation.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2012). 
195 See Kent Oz, Note, Independent Fund Administrators as a Solution for Hedge 
Fund Fraud, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 329, 350 n.166 (2009). 
196 See id. at 335. 
197 See Ryan Sklar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge 
Fund Managers’ Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251, 3268 (2009). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 3268–69. 
200 See IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 41, at viii; 
Susan M. Mangiero, Hedge Fund Valuation: What Pension Fiduciaries Need to 
Know, J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS, Aug. 2006, at 20, available at 
http://www.bvallc.com/pdf/hedgefund2006.pdf (stressing the importance of pension 
plans becoming familiar with hedge fund valuation procedures); The SEC Isn’t 
Finished with Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 17, 2006), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_29/b3993055.htm (discussing 
the difficulties associated with the subjective valuation procedures for certain assets 
traded by hedge funds). See generally Sklar, supra note 197. 
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2009.201  This manual includes recommendations that fund 
valuations be “fair, consistent, and verifiable.”202  The Asset 
Managers’ Committee, under the direction of the President’s 
Working Group, even issued a best practices report on January 
15, 2009, which recommends “[r]obust valuation procedures that 
call for a segregation of responsibilities, thorough written 
policies, oversight and other measures for the valuation of assets, 
including a specific focus on hard-to-value assets.”203  Despite 
these numerous recommendations, the Dodd-Frank Act does not 
address the valuation issue.204  While it is difficult to create a 
uniform standard for all hedge fund investments since the 
strategies employed by hedge funds are heterogeneous and 
distinct from traditional investments, it is vital that certain 
standards are developed and applied consistently.  This can 
perhaps be achieved by requiring third-party oversight for 
valuation procedures, by creating separate valuation procedures 
for different types of instruments, or by adopting the models 
proposed by the MFA or other similar organizations.   
E.  Lack of Standardized Risk Management Practices 
In addition to evaluating the returns of hedge fund 
investments, sophisticated investors are also looking for ways to 
compare and aggregate risks across a number of portfolios.205  
The four components of risk that sophisticated investors 
 
201 MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, SOUND PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND MANAGERS 1 
(2009), available at http://www.managedfunds.org/files/pdf’s/MFA_Sound_Practices_ 
2009.pdf [hereinafter MFA BEST PRACTICES GUIDE]. 
202 Id. at 7. 
203 BEST PRACTICES FOR THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY: REPORT OF THE ASSET 
MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE TO THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL 
MARKETS iii (2009), available at 
http://www.amaicmte.org/Public/AMC%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf. 
204 It should be noted that under the SEC Proposal, the SEC mandates a 
uniform method for calculating “regulatory assets under management” for purposes 
of determining whether advisers can rely on certain exemptions. However, advisers 
can deviate from this method for purposes of calculating their fees and returns, 
which is how investors typically measure the success of a particular fund. In 
addition, this uniform measure is not required for other disclosures that are 
voluntarily given to investors. As a clarification, “assets under management” 
generally includes all assets that a particular adviser manages, which could 
encompass multiple funds. As a result, this proposal does not create a uniform 
measure on a fund-by-fund basis. 
205 See HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 2. 
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generally evaluate include volatility, diversification, leverage, 
and liquidity.206  Volatility refers to the amount of uncertainty 
associated with the value of a particular investment, while 
diversification refers to the extent to which a portfolio includes a 
wide variety of investments.207  Leverage refers to the ratio of a 
firm’s debt to its equity capital,208 while illiquidity refers to 
whether an investment could be easily sold or exchanged for cash 
without a substantial loss in value.209  Another category of risk 
that is not subject to quantitative analysis is “operational risk[ ]” 
which “include[s] organizational aspects such as the reliability of 
back-office operations, legal infrastructure, accounting and trade 
reconciliation, personnel issues, and the day-to-day management 
of the business.”210  Operational risks have recently gained more 
attention since most hedge fund failures result from operational 
inefficiencies.211 
Various models can be used to measure each of these risk 
components.  However, with respect to the hedge fund industry, 
there is no standardized format for measuring or reporting the 
various types of risks created by hedge fund investments.212  
Moreover, hedge funds are not required to disclose specific 
information with respect to their specific risk calculations or 
 
206 Id. at 3. 
207 Volatility Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/ 
volatility.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2012); Diversification Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/diversification.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2012).   
208 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
209 Illiquid Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ 
illiquid.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2012). 
210 Andrew W. Lo, Risk Management for Hedge Funds: Introduction and 
Overview 31 (Working Paper Series 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=283308. 
211 See Gareth Jones, Operational Due Diligence: Increased Demands for Hedge 
Fund Managers and Investors, THE HEDGE FUND J. (June 2010), 
http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/magazine/201006/opinion/operational-due-
diligence.php. 
212 See Pearson & Pearson, supra note 182, at 47–48. This point is reiterated by 
Mark J.P. Anson, a senior investment officer with CalPERS, a prominent 
institutional investor. He states that “there is no standard platform for measuring 
risk and no standard format for reporting it. . . . Consequently, the risks of several 
hedge fund managers cannot be combined.” Mark J.P. Anson, Hedge Fund Risk 
Management for Institutions, in MANAGING HEDGE FUND RISK: FROM THE SEAT OF 
THE PRACTITIONER—VIEWS FROM INVESTORS, COUNTERPARTIES, HEDGE FUNDS AND 
CONSULTANTS 19, 21 (Virginia Reynolds Parker ed., 2000). 
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methodologies.213  As a result, it is difficult for hedge fund 
investors to compare a variety of hedge fund risk exposures, 
which makes harder to achieve optimal risk allocations.  While 
the PWG recognized that “[i]nvestors should understand their 
investments and the corresponding risks, and should not expose 
themselves to risk levels they cannot tolerate,”214 the Dodd-Frank 
Act does little to ensure that investors are given the appropriate 
tools to properly assess risk.   
F.  Information Asymmetries Create a “Lemons” Market  
The above investor protection issues create distinct 
information asymmetries between advisers and investors.  These 
asymmetries have possibly created a “market for lemons” within 
the hedge fund industry.215  Essentially, a “market for lemons” is 
created when individuals within a particular market buy goods 
or services without knowing the true quality of such goods or 
services.216  The sellers within these markets have more 
knowledge about the quality of their goods than the buyers.217  As 
a result, the high quality goods and the low quality goods will 
inevitably end up selling at the same price since the buyer cannot 
tell the difference between a high quality good and a low quality 
good.218  This would in turn push out the higher quality goods 
since they would not be rewarded for their superiority.219 
With respect to the hedge fund industry, the lack of 
standardized valuation and risk reporting mechanisms make it 
difficult for investors to know the true value of such investments.  
As a result, it is possible that certain hedge funds with different 
qualities will have the same price, because investors are not 
aware of the true value of a hedge fund investment.220  The value 
of a hedge fund is frequently measured by the extent to which a 
 
213 See id. 
214 PWG Agreement, supra note 193, at 2. 
215 George A. Akerlof, The Market For “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488, 488 (1970).   
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 488–89. 
218 Id. at 489. 
219 Id. at 489–90. 
220 Martin Wolf, Why Today’s Hedge Fund Industry May Not Survive, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c8941ad4-f503-11dc-a21b-
000077b07658.html#axzz1ahuRDXfA. 
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manager’s skill or talent contributes to the actual returns 
exhibited by a particular fund.221  However, it is possible for a 
hedge fund manager to temporarily earn high returns by using a 
probability analysis to place bets on certain market events, 
without developing a long-term and legitimate investment 
plan.222  For example, if a manager with no investment talent 
uses a probability analysis to determine that it is highly unlikely 
that the S&P 500 index will fall more than 20%, the manager 
could write options on this unlikely S&P event and sell them in 
the marketplace.223  Thus, if the S&P 500 does not tank, the 
manager will be able to keep the money earned from selling the 
options and this will increase the fund’s returns.224  On the other 
hand, in the rare event that the S&P 500 tanks, the manager will 
have to use the fund’s assets to pay the option-holders who were 
on the opposite end of the bet.225  If this happens, the investors 
will have lost the total value of their initial investments.226 
Since investors often evaluate hedge funds by comparing 
their returns, without having the tools to effectively evaluate 
and/or compare hedge funds’ valuation and risk policies, it is 
difficult to differentiate a talented manager from an 
unscrupulous one.  These issues could be partially addressed 
through implementing standardized business practices and 
improving the transparency of all hedge funds, regardless of their 
asset sizes.  The Dodd-Frank Act does little to address these 
issues since it seems to be primarily focused on mitigating 
systemic risk, as opposed to enhancing investor protection. 
IV. THE BROADER IMPACT OF HEDGE FUND INVESTMENTS 
This Part explains why hedge fund investors should be 
entitled to greater investor protection under our federal 
securities laws.  While Part III supports this view by explaining 
 
221 STEFANINI, supra note 24, at 12. 
222 Gaming the System: Are Hedge Fund Managers Talented, or Just Good at 
Fooling Investors?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Apr. 2, 2008), 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1931&jsessionid=9a3077a
90249657e225f.  
223 Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young, Hedge Fund Wizards, ECONOMISTS’ 
VOICE, Feb. 2008, at 1. 
224 Id. at 1–2.  
225 Id. at 2. 
226 Id. 
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how the hedge fund industry can create undue risk for 
sophisticated investors, this Part explains how the losses of such 
investors can extend to other market participants, such as retail 
investors, as well as to the general public.  For example, many 
pension plans that invest in hedge funds could expose their 
underlying investors to excessive risks.  In addition, the SEC 
uses a significant amount of its resources to monitor the hedge 
fund industry, even though sophisticated investors are presumed 
to be sufficiently capable of protecting themselves.  These costs 
could be mitigated if sophisticated investors were provided 
greater protections that would enable them to make better 
investment choices.  More importantly, since our markets are 
inextricably connected, the overall stability of the entire economy 
can be adversely impacted by such losses.  For these reasons, 
expanding investor protection principles to hedge fund investors 
will help to protect the overall integrity of our security markets.  
This Part further explains each of these issues. 
A.  Hedge Fund Fraud 
The SEC uses a significant portion of its resources 
investigating and prosecuting fraudulent hedge fund advisers.227  
While hedge funds are subject to the anti-fraud provisions under 
the federal securities laws,228 these laws failed to prevent the 
occurrence of multiple instances of hedge fund fraud.  For 
example, from 1999 to 2004, the SEC investigated fifty-one cases 
involving hedge fund fraud, which caused investors to lose over 
$1.1 billion.229  More recently, from 2006 to the first four months 
of 2009, the SEC investigated eighty-four cases of hedge fund 
fraud.230  Thus, the number of these investigations has actually 
increased in recent years.  A current example of hedge fund fraud 
occurred during the financial crisis, when the SEC charged two 
former Bear Stearns Hedge Fund managers with fraud for 
 
227 See, e.g., Linda Chatman Thomsen et al., Hedge Funds: An Enforcement 
Perspective, 39 RUTGERS L. J. 541, 542 (2008). This article is authored by members of 
the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. Id. at 1. It provides a detailed analysis of the 
various kinds of SEC enforcement cases that have been brought against hedge fund 
advisers. See generally id. 
228 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
229 See Jane J. Kim, Digging for Hedge-Fund Dirt, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2005, at 
C1. 
230 Commissioner Aguilar Speech, supra note 4. 
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misleading investors about the funds’ financial state.231  In this 
case, the investors suffered approximately $1.8 billion in losses 
after these funds took highly leveraged trades within the 
subprime mortgage backed securities markets.232  The SEC 
further alleges that  
when the hedge funds took increasing hits to the value of their 
portfolios during the first five months of 2007 and faced 
escalating redemptions and margin calls, then-[Bear Stern 
Asset Management] senior managing directors Ralph R. Cioffi 
and Matthew M. Tannin deceived their own investors and 
certain institutional counterparties about the funds’ growing 
troubles.233   
Andrew J. Donohue reiterated the limitations of relying on 
these anti-fraud provisions to adequately protect investors by 
stating: “It is not uncommon that our first contact with a [hedge 
fund] manager of a significant amount of assets is during an 
investigation by our Enforcement Division.”234  Thus, the anti-
fraud provisions within the securities laws fail to adequately 
protect sophisticated investors.  If these investors had greater 
protections at the outset of the transaction, then they might be 
able to better detect fraudulent hedge fund activities before 
disaster hits.  This would in turn preserve the resources that the 
SEC uses to investigate these claims.  
 
 
 
231 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Two Former Bear Stearns Hedge Fund 
Managers with Fraud (June 19, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2008/2008-115.htm. 
232 Id.  
233 Id. 
234 Testimony Concerning Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment 
Pools, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs (July 15, 2009) (statement of Andrew J. 
Donohue, Director, Division of Investment Management, SEC), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts071509ajd.htm. 
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B. Increased Exposure to Retail Investors and Other 
Constituents 
Many academics, as well as the SEC, have highlighted the 
risk of retail investors235 being indirectly exposed to hedge funds 
since pension plans, insurance companies, charitable trusts, and 
other institutional investors have been increasingly investing 
into these vehicles.236  A 2007 study revealed that institutional 
investors account for over 50% of hedge fund investments.237  
However, a more recent study revealed that institutional 
investors account for over 61% of total hedge fund investments, 
and will continue to increase in upcoming years.238  Additionally, 
one source found that fund-of-funds accounted for 30% of the 
total amount of assets in the hedge fund industry.239  As 
background, fund-of-funds are investment vehicle structures that 
are available to retail investors, even though they directly invest 
into a large number of underlying hedge funds.240  Furthermore, 
two-thirds of endowments241 have significant hedge fund 
 
235 Retail investors are individuals who purchase small amounts of securities for 
themselves, as opposed to institutional investors. Retail Investor Definition, 
INVESTOR WORDS, http://www.investorwords.com/4231/retail_investor.html (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2012). 
236 Testimony Concerning Investor Protection and the Regulation of Hedge Funds 
Advisers, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs (July 
15, 2004) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Former Chairman, SEC), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts071504whd.htm; Christopher Cox Testimony, 
supra note 46 (specifying that “the investor protection issues that stem from the 
increasing exposure of retail investors to hedge fund investment opportunities”); 
Alexander R. Roche, The Regulator Strikes Back: A Look at the SEC’s Most Recent 
Attempt To Regulate Hedge Funds and What It Missed, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 145, 
153 (2007). 
237 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks of Under Secretary for 
Domestic Finance Robert K. Steel on Private Pools of Capital (Feb. 27, 2007), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp280.aspx. 
238 Madison Marriage, Institutional Investors Driving Investment in Hedge 
Funds, HEDGE FUND REV. (Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.hedgefundsreview.com/hedge-
funds-review/news/2025856/institutional-investors-driving-investment-hedge-funds. 
239 Jane J. Kim, Hedge Funds Target Smaller Investors: As Cheaper Options 
Proliferate, Some Doubt the Gains Can Last, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2005, at D1. 
240 Ryan Barnes, Hedge Funds Go Retail, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/07/mutual_fund_retail.asp (last 
visited on Sept.. 15, 2012). 
241 Endowment Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/endowment.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2012) 
(defining endowment as “[a] financial asset donation made to a non-profit group or 
institution in the form of investment funds or other property that has a stated 
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investments.242  Many non-profit groups, academic institutions, 
and other organizations rely on endowments to support their 
various functions.243  Overall, these institutional investors, as 
opposed to wealthy individuals, are becoming the dominant 
investor class within the hedge fund industry.244  
While the overall impact on retail investors is not entirely 
clear, it goes without question that they are increasingly being 
exposed to hedge fund investments.  Moreover, some analysts 
predict that losses incurred by these institutional investors 
“could eventually lead to reduced payouts to retirees, higher 
taxes so state governments can fulfill their promises, or less cash 
available for colleges to give out as financial aid.”245  For example, 
in April 2006, San Diego’s pension fund incurred significant 
losses when its underlying hedge fund investments were 
overexposed to losses in the natural gas industry.246  The pension 
plan’s strategy included a group of hedge funds, which initially 
helped the plan to achieve higher returns than the rest of its 
portfolio.247  However, the subsequent losses of those hedge funds 
caused the pension fund to incur corresponding losses that 
adversely impacted its 33,000 county workers.248  Those county 
workers were all retail investors, who had no control over the 
underlying investments of the pension fund, which of course, was 
deemed a sophisticated investor.  The pension fund may not have 
had sufficient knowledge of the hedge funds’ overexposure to 
certain natural gas trades since the hedge funds were not 
required to fully disclose their trading positions or leverage 
 
purpose at the bequest of the donor. Most endowments are designed to keep the 
principal amount intact while using the investment income from dividends for 
charitable efforts”). 
242 Christopher Cox Testimony, supra note 46. 
243 DIANA S. NEWMAN, NONPROFIT ESSENTIALS: ENDOWMENT BUILDING xiv 
(2005). 
244 Barnes, supra note 240.  
245 Rachel Beck & Joe Bel Bruno, College, State Pension Funds, Endowments Are 
Hurting, USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2008, 9:01 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/ 
retirement/2008-12-03-pension-funds-endowments_N.htm. 
246 Mary Williams Walsh, Pension Fund Tallies Losses and Rethinks Its 
Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, at C4. 
247 Id. 
248 Id.; see also Rami Grunbaum, Offshore Hedge Fund Is Trouble for Seattle’s 
Pension Fund, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 10, 2010, 10:02 PM), 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2011570587_sundaybuzz1
1.html. 
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exposure.  If the pension fund and/or fund’s underlying investors 
were privy to this information, the subsequent losses could have 
been prevented.  In effect, you cannot increase protection to retail 
investors, without directly protecting sophisticated investors, 
since the sophisticated investors—which include pensions plans 
and other institutions—are, in essence, controlling the 
investment of the retail investor. 
C. Increased Exposure to the Entire Economy 
Sophisticated investors have a history of suffering significant 
losses and those losses can have an adverse impact on the entire 
economy.  The losses of several notable sophisticated investors 
also facilitated and magnified the most recent financial crisis.  
For instance, multiple sophisticated investors were exposed to 
the severe losses incurred by AIG,249 which is a prominent global 
insurance company that was overextended in the credit default 
swap (“CDS”) market.  A CDS is a derivative instrument where a 
protection party—in this case, AIG—insures against the losses of 
a purchasing party who engages in certain debt transactions.250  
The purchasing party pays the protection party a periodic 
premium, while the protection party promises to pay the 
purchasing party’s debt in the event of a default.251  Protection 
parties collect a stream of premiums from multiple 
counterparties, with the hope that such parties do not 
simultaneously default on their underlying debts.252  However, 
AIG issued $440 billion in CDS while the real estate market 
suffered unprecedented losses.253  As a result, many of these CDS 
holders began to demand payment by AIG, but AIG could not 
fulfill their end of the bargain.254  When AIG subsequently 
collapsed, many of the primary CDS holders, which included 
prominent investment banks, hedge funds, and other insurance  
 
 
249 Lynn Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-
regulating Them Can Prevent Another, LOMBARD ST., July 6, 2009, at 4, 4. 
250 DURBIN, supra note 62, at 64. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 73. 
253 Christopher Cox, Op-Ed., Swapping Secrecy for Transparency, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 19, 2008, at WK.12. 
254 Id. 
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companies, were exposed to severe financial distress.255  The 
government had to employ a $180 billion bailout plan to prevent 
a severe systemic risk event.256   
While the CDS market is currently being subject to a new 
regulatory framework under the Dodd-Frank Act,257 the AIG 
example highlights the impact that the aggregate losses of 
sophisticated investors can have on the entire economy.  By and 
large, the recent financial crisis was exacerbated by the losses of 
sophisticated investors.258  These losses had a monumental effect 
on the integrity of our markets and the general public felt its 
devastating effects.  Yet, retail investors did not have access to 
many of the markets and/or transactions that facilitated the 
crisis because they were excluded from this sector of the 
economy.  While it is arguable that greed motivated the poor 
decisions of sophisticated investors, it is clear that many of these 
investors did not fully understand the risks entailed within these 
complex transactions.  Thus, removing the assumption that 
sophisticated investors can fend for themselves is an essential 
step towards creating a more efficient regulatory regime.  As 
proposed in this Article, a regulatory approach that improves 
investor protection for sophisticated investors would inevitably 
lead to better functioning markets. 
V. ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
This Part proposes an alternative regulatory framework that 
begins with the retooling of certain private fund exemptions 
under the Dodd-Frank Act.  As further explained in this section, 
this framework would also necessitate the creation of an SRO 
that would be primarily responsible for the development of 
uniform and mandatory measures of valuation and risk.  This 
section continues by exposing the limitations associated with this 
proposal and provides a brief cost-benefit analysis.  It concludes 
by addressing the counterarguments that would likely follow this 
framework.  
 
255 Stout, supra note 249. 
256 Id. 
257 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.   
258 See Carl Hulse, House Approves Tougher Rules on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 2009, at A1. 
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A. Retooling Private Fund Exemptions 
Since investor protection issues apply to all hedge funds, 
each hedge fund should be subject to heightened regulation 
regardless of its asset size.  Accordingly, the exemption of 
advisers with less than $150 million of assets under management 
should be repealed.  Advisers who manage between $25 million 
and $100 million in assets should also remain subject to federal 
registration, as opposed to being regulated by the states.  This 
would essentially revert to the previous standard where the 
states regulated advisers who had less than $25 million in assets 
under management.259  Also, futures funds that are exempt from 
registration with the CFTC should at least be subject to 
regulation by the SEC, or another regulatory body.  Thus, the 
definition of private fund under the Dodd-Frank Act should be 
revised so that it captures such exempt funds. 
B. Creation of an SRO for Hedge Funds  
An SRO is “a non-governmental organization that has the 
power to create and enforce industry regulations and standards.  
The priority is to protect investors through the establishment of 
rules that promote ethics and equality.”260  The federal securities 
laws were designed to incorporate self-regulation as a primary 
component of securities regulation because it is more cost 
effective.261  The SEC also found SRO’s to be more cost effective 
because the complexities of securities trading practices made it 
more practical for private industry participants to be directly 
involved with rulemaking.262  Relatedly, since the SRO members 
are more familiar with their own business practices, they would 
likely set heightened business conduct standards that exceeded 
 
259 See General Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iaregulation/memoia.htm (last visited Sept. 
15, 2012); see also James E. Bedar et al., Alert: SEC Announces New Rules 
Regulating Private-Fund Advisers, BROWN RUDNICK (June 30, 2011), 
http://www.brownrudnick.com/uploads/114/doc/Brown_Rudnick_SEC_Announces_Ne
w_Rules_Regulating_Private-Fund_Advisers_6-11.pdf. 
260 Self-Regulatory Organization Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sro.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).  
261 Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Release No. 34-50700, 17 
C.F.R. § 240 (Mar. 8, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-
50700.htm#P73_6136. 
262 Id. 
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those that would have been imposed by the SEC.263  Furthermore, 
since the final SRO decisions are subject to final approval by the 
SEC, it is the perfect combination of federal and private 
oversight.264  Due to the unique investor protection issues that 
arise from hedge fund investments, an SRO should be created, 
which would be primarily responsible for establishing various 
rules and standards within the hedge fund industry.265  Under 
the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress has already instructed the SEC to 
prepare a study to evaluate whether the creation of a SRO for 
private advisers would be beneficial to investors.266  
The first task of this SRO would be to establish standardized 
valuation mechanisms and risk measurements that would be 
mandatory for all registered private funds.  Of course, the 
standards created by this SRO would remain subject to final 
approval by the SEC.267  Industry participants are probably in a 
better position to create these standards since the hedge fund 
industry is heterogeneous and entails risks that are 
distinguishable from traditional investments.  The creation of an 
SRO would give industry participants an opportunity to 
implement some of the various models that have already been 
developed.  This SRO could also assist the CFTC and the SEC 
with resolving the inefficiencies that result from the dual 
regulation of certain funds.  
This new SRO would probably be similar to the industry-
wide organizations that already exist.  For example, many of the 
larger and more prominent funds have become members of 
organizations such as the MFA and the AIMA.  The MFA’s 
members “include the vast majority of the largest hedge fund 
groups in the world who manage a substantial portion of the 
approximately $1.5 trillion invested in absolute return 
strategies” and are “the leading advocate[s] for sound business 
 
263 Id. 
264 See Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies Be Subject to a New 
Statutory Self-Regulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1115, 1120 (2005). 
265 See also J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund 
Regulation, Part II, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 814 (2007) 
(discussing the additional benefits of implementing an SRO for hedge funds). 
266 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 416, 124 Stat. 1376, 1579 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-18c (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
267 See id. 
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practices and industry growth.”268  The AIMA’s members include 
“hedge fund manager members [who] manage in excess of 75% of 
global hedge fund assets and 70% of global fund of hedge funds 
assets.”269  These organizations have already created education, 
regulation, policy development, and sound practices that can be 
used by institutional investors, policymakers, and supervisors.270 
C. Develop a Risk Database for Hedge Funds 
Once the SRO creates standardized valuation and risk 
measures, it should create a risk database that would include the 
new standardized risk measures that will have been adopted and 
implemented by all registered private funds.  Such risk measures 
would be tabulated and made available to interested investors in 
some general form.  The database would not be publicly available 
on the SEC’s website since retail investors are prohibited from 
investing directly into hedge funds, which are private investment 
vehicles.  Additionally, this risk database should be constructed 
so that the proprietary holdings of hedge funds are protected.  
This would also prevent “herding” behavior of hedge fund 
advisers since the additional disclosures would be primarily 
focused on risk and valuations.   
While it would admittedly be difficult to develop uniform 
measures of risk for the multiple types of hedge fund investments 
that currently exist, it is certainly feasible.  One example of a 
risk-reporting model was developed by Kenmar, a global 
investment management and fund of hedge funds firm.271  This 
model is called the “Risk Fundamentals Solution” and it 
described as follows: 
The system is a sophisticated risk management application that 
uses a standard template to create a comprehensive risk profile 
of the fund without disclosing any position data.  The system 
automatically tracks the fundamental risk measures over time 
 
268 About Managed Funds Association, MANAGEDFUNDS.ORG, 
http://www.managedfunds.org/forum2011/about-mfa-forum-2011.asp (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2012).  
269 Global Hedge Fund Industry Employs 300,000 People, AIMA (Dec. 10, 2010), 
http://www.aima.org/en/media/press-releases.cfm/id/5A158030-55AA-4D8E-
BEE0E03BC0379A0F. 
270 See id. 
271 HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 250–51.  
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and compares each measure to those of the fund’s peer group 
and the universe of hedge funds.  The risk profile includes 
measures of: [r]eturns[,] [l]iquidity[,] [l]everage[,] [r]isk-factor 
sensitivity[,] [v]olatility[,] [d]iversification[,] [r]isk-adjusted 
return[,] [v]alue at [r]isk[,] [s]tress tests[, and p]erformance 
attribution[.]  The system can automatically distribute these 
risk profiles electronically.  These risk profiles can be compared 
and aggregated across funds to analyze the risks of a portfolio of 
funds.272 
The Risk Fundamentals Solution model is an example of a 
reporting framework that creates consistent and reliable 
measures of risks for various categories of hedge fund 
investments.  While it is noted that the effectiveness of this 
model warrants additional research that is outside the scope of 
this Article, this example demonstrates that a risk reporting 
framework, which does not expose the positions of hedge funds, is 
feasible.  It also proves that regulators can work with industry  
participants to explore and develop unique solutions that 
partially eradicate these unique investor protection issues that 
the hedge fund industry has created. 
By and large, this risk database system would ensure that 
sophisticated investors can adequately compare various hedge 
fund investments.  It would  allow such investors to compare a 
specific fund with the overall distribution of risk for all hedge 
funds, or for subsets of funds that employ a particular 
investment strategy.  In addition, giving this information to the 
SEC would allow it to see if there was a more general systemic 
risk issue with respect to a single hedge fund or subset of funds.  
This framework would also allow analysts and other industry 
specialists that represent the interests of sophisticated investors 
to better monitor hedge fund activities and assist with the 
prevention of investment adviser fraud and systemic risk.  
Moreover, it could reduce the information asymmetries that have 
led to the creation of a “lemons market” and limit the ability of 
hedge fund managers to control the marketplace.273  Essentially, 
 
272 Id.  
273 See Barry W. Rashkover & Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman, SEC Enforcement 
and Examinations Concerning Hedge Funds, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 599 (2008). This 
article specifically states that  
[SEC] Examiners also have recently shown interest in how portfolio 
managers share information and ideas with non-affiliated portfolio 
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this reporting system would lower the search costs associated 
with finding an optimal hedge fund investment.  This would 
increase the capacity of investors to make informed decisions, 
which should in turn improve the overall process of marketing 
such funds. 
D. Limitations 
Since the hedge fund industry is heterogeneous, and thus 
engages in a large range of trading activities and strategies, it 
will admittedly be difficult to create standardized mechanisms 
for valuation and risk.  However, most hedge funds fall within 
certain identifiable categories, so different mechanisms can be 
developed for each particular investment strategy.  Different 
mechanisms can also apply to certain asset classes that are 
frequently traded by hedge funds.  With respect to risk measures, 
hedge funds should be able to produce consistent numbers that 
reflect its leverage exposure, volatility, and diversification, 
despite the fact that the industry is heterogeneous. 
It will also be difficult to determine the ideal methodologies 
for the reporting framework since hedge fund advisers have 
various preferences for measuring risk and calculating 
valuations.  However, this is a necessary task that has been 
undertaken by other notable organizations.  For example, FASB 
issues specific guidelines on how to report specific financial 
statement line items as well as any corresponding disclosures 
within any applicable footnotes.274  Actual industry participants 
are in the best position to develop these methodologies, since the 
SEC has limited expertise in these areas.  While the final 
methodologies will remain subject to SEC approval, the SRO will 
maintain responsibility for developing the initial framework.  
 
managers. The concern appears to be that due to the size of the hedge fund 
industry in general and the magnitude of assets controlled by certain funds 
in particular, hedge funds are now in a position not only to control 
companies but to move markets—especially if two or more funds comprise a 
“group” working together to maximize return with respect to a specific 
issuer or strategy. 
Id. at 620–21.  
274 Id. at 624 n.175. 
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E. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The proposed alternative framework, which includes the 
creation of an SRO, should be subject to a detailed cost-benefit 
analysis to ensure that the marginal costs of implementing this 
system do not exceed the marginal benefits.  Professor Howell E. 
Jackson from Harvard Law School gives helpful guidance on how 
to implement this analysis in his article, Variation in the 
Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and 
Potential Implications.275  He also exposes some of the inherent 
challenges of implementing a cost-benefit analysis for financial 
regulation.276  For example, it is difficult to measure the private 
costs of regulation with respect to the “incremental costs that 
financial institutions incur beyond the levels of effort they would 
expend in the absence of regulation” and the “transactions that 
regulatory intervention unintentionally deters.”277  As Professor 
Jackson further notes, it is difficult to measure the benefits of 
protecting the general public and eliminating externalities from 
financial failure.278  Despite these challenges, it is still important 
to analyze these issues when developing a new framework for 
financial regulation.  Thus, this section will analyze the extent to 
which the benefits of developing this system outweigh the actual 
costs.  
1. Costs 
There would be significant costs associated with the creation 
of a new SRO for hedge funds.  However, the SEC is already set 
to incur significant costs in monitoring newly registered advisers 
and collecting and analyzing systemic risk data from registered 
hedge fund advisers.  In addition, the SEC will have to use its 
resources to create reliable measures of systemic risk and to 
determine which hedge funds pose a systemic threat to the 
economy.  A new SRO could actually help the SEC to undertake  
 
 
 
275 Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: 
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2007). 
276 Id. at 255. 
277 Id. at 261. 
278 Id. at 259–60. 
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these newly created tasks under the Dodd-Frank Act.  SROs are 
in fact intended to be a cost-effective solution for problems in 
which the SEC has limited expertise.279  
There would also be costs associated with developing a 
standardized reporting framework.  However, the SRO could use 
the systemic risk data, which the SEC is already authorized to 
collect, to compile the risk database system that is proposed 
herein.  Essentially, the SEC would be putting this data into the 
hands of the actual investors, instead of keeping it to themselves.  
Furthermore, the MFA and AIFMA are already incurring private 
costs in developing best practices models and other 
recommendations for standardized operating functions, valuation 
mechanisms, and risk assessments.280  In effect, this solution 
corresponds to the increasing demands of private actors within 
the industry.  As a result, the costs of developing such standards 
could be minimal if these standards are considered ideal by the 
newly created SRO.   
2.  Benefits 
The primary benefit of creating this alternative framework is 
that it gives sophisticated investors more information to make 
better investment choices.  It would resolve many of the unique 
investor protection issues discussed herein by mandating certain 
business practices within the hedge fund industry and creating a 
risk database that would allow investors to adequately 
investigate and compare a larger range of hedge fund 
investments.  This would give such investors more reliable data 
to ensure that they fully understand the corresponding risks of 
investing in hedge funds. 
Overall, this new framework would help to preserve the 
integrity of our capital markets by creating a more transparent 
hedge fund marketplace.  Transparency is typically the best 
mechanism for exposing deficiencies that could lead to various 
market failures.  Before our recent financial crises, this benefit 
was probably thought to be somewhat vague and arbitrary.  Yet, 
 
279 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-623, PRIVATE FUND ADVISERS: 
ALTHOUGH A SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION COULD SUPPLEMENT SEC 
OVERSIGHT, IT WOULD PRESENT CHALLENGES AND TRADE-OFFS 20 (2011), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11623.pdf. 
280 See Jackson, supra note 275, at 260. 
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after our economy has lost trillions of dollars in recovering from 
the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, it is 
essential that our regulators play a more vital role in 
implementing ex ante regulation to enhance transparency, which 
would subsequently improve the integrity of our markets.  
Furthermore, this reporting framework would help the 
regulators to better understand the hedge fund industry.  It 
would also open the door to more meaningful empirical research 
opportunities to better understand the complexities of the 
industry.  Several empirical research studies have been 
completed, but they are severely limited in scope because there is 
no existing reporting framework that tracks all hedge funds.  
While many hedge funds do report their returns to various 
reporting indexes, such reporting is not mandatory.  The most 
prominent hedge fund index is the Dow Jones Credit Suisse 
Hedge Fund IndexSM—formerly known as the Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index—and it tracks approximately 
8,000 funds.281  This number includes offshore funds, and 
excludes fund-of-funds.282  In addition, the index only includes 
funds that have a minimum of $50 million assets under 
management, a minimum one-year track record, and current 
audited financial statements.283  Overall, there are about 18,000 
hedge funds in existence, but it is difficult to verify this number 
since there is no mandatory reporting framework that tracks all 
hedge funds.284 
F. Counterarguments to Alternative Approach 
1. Deterrence of Hedge Fund Activity 
Some commenters believe that this proposed framework may 
deter hedge funds from operating in the United States.  However, 
this proposed framework seeks to protect the proprietary position 
data of hedge funds, which is often the primary hurdle towards 
achieving better transparency practices within the industry.  In 
 
281 Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indexes: FAQ’s, HEDGEINDEX.COM, 
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/en/faq.aspx?cy=USD&indexname=HEDG 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2012).  
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
284  PERTRAC FIN. SOLUTIONS, supra note 14. 
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fact, many hedge funds are already disclosing comparable 
information to investors, who are starting to demand more 
information in response to the recent financial crisis.  For 
example, one study enacted by PricewaterhouseCoopers found 
that following the financial crisis, “[Hedge fund] [i]nvestors are 
requiring far higher standards of governance and more robust 
operations, combined with greater transparency into operational 
controls, investment portfolio construction and performance.”285  
In addition, the development of this reporting framework will 
include the perspectives of industry participants through the 
creation of an SRO.  As a result, the industry will have a voice in 
discussing the extent to which the disclosure of certain 
information would cause harm to its investors. 
2. Political Hurdles 
Some commenters also believe that the proposed alternative 
framework would be too difficult to implement from a political 
standpoint, especially since it would directly contradict long-
standing notions of investor protection principles.  In effect, this 
framework would single-handedly dismantle the sophisticated 
investor doctrine, which asserts that sophisticated investors are 
fully capable of protecting themselves, without government 
intervention.  However, the Dodd-Frank Act has already 
indirectly limited the effectiveness of this doctrine.  Essentially, 
by bringing hedge funds under the SEC’s umbrella, Congress has 
sent a signal that such investors are no longer capable of 
monitoring the markets.  The ensuing regulations under the 
Dodd-Frank Act will likely further dismantle the sophisticated  
 
 
 
285 From Black Box to Open Book: Hedge Fund Trust and Transparency, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (2010), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/ 
asset-management/assets/pwc-hf-trust-and-transparency.pdf. This view was 
reiterated in a report published by Ernst & Young, which stated that, “The global 
hedge fund industry . . . is responding readily to investor requests for greater 
transparency[.]” Hedge Funds Rebound Amid Calls for Greater Transparency, ERNST 
& YOUNG (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Newsroom/News-releases/ 
Hedge_funds-rebound-amid-calls-for-greater-transparency. See also Stephan Thollot, 
Push for Transparency Puts Spotlight on Valuation for Alternative Asset Managers, 
ERNST & YOUNG (Oct. 2011), available at https://eyaprimo.ey.com/ 
natlmktgaprimoey/Attachments/AMCenter_Valuation_J00370.pdf.  
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investor doctrine.  Thus, implementing a framework that 
explicitly acknowledges this proposition may not be as difficult to 
accomplish given the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
3. Cost Limitations 
Some commenters may think that this system is too costly to 
implement.  There is definitely merit to this argument since the 
SEC has publicly admitted that its limited resources make it 
difficult to effectively monitor registered advisers.286  However, 
this may be an indication that the existing regulatory framework 
is ineffective, especially given the multiple market failures that 
have occurred in recent years.  The federal government has 
expended trillions of dollars in correcting these failures, in which 
hedge funds play a significant role.  Perhaps a better use of the 
government’s resources would be to creating ex ante regulation 
that would prevent comparable market failures.  It is clear that 
the existing regulation did little to prevent these failures and for 
the most part, the Dodd-Frank Act does little to reinvent the 
wheel. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article presents an alternative regulatory framework 
for the increased regulation of hedge funds, which focuses on the 
unique investor protection issues created by the hedge fund 
industry.  It would supplement the new regulation provided 
under the Dodd-Frank Act, which seems to primarily focus on 
preventing systemic risk.  This framework would enhance 
investor protection by standardizing certain business practices 
within the overall hedge fund industry and creating a risk 
database that would allow investors to adequately compare a 
larger range of hedge fund investments.  Furthermore, this 
reporting framework would open the door to more meaningful 
empirical research opportunities to better understand the hedge 
fund market and give investors more reliable data without 
exposing hedge funds’ positions. 
In addition, it could potentially decrease the likelihood of 
systemic risk since it would create more transparency within the 
hedge fund industry.  Mary Schapiro, the Chairman of the SEC, 
 
286 See supra note 108. 
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stated that systemic risk could be mitigated by “the traditional 
oversight, regulation, market transparency and enforcement 
provided by primary regulators that helps keep systemic risk 
from developing in the first place.”287  While it is arguable that 
greed motivated the poor decisions of sophisticated investors, it is 
clear that many of these investors did not fully understand the 
risks entailed within these complex transactions.  Thus, 
removing the assumption that sophisticated investors can fend 
for themselves is an essential step towards creating a more 
efficient regulatory regime.  In effect, by focusing on investor 
protection and implementing ex ante regulation,288 our 
regulators, as well as actual hedge fund investors, might be in a 
better position to stop systemic risk before it actually occurs. 
 
287  Testimony Concerning Regulation of Systemic Risk, Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of 
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ 
2009/ts072309mls.htm. 
288 RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 31 (2009) (proposing implementing ex ante regulation as 
regulating the financial industry before a catastrophic event occurs). 
